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Introduction
D igital Photography is having a rapid and ever growing diffusion in re-cent years, since it allows anyone to take an arbitrary number of good
quality images, quickly and at no cost, and to store them easily on a large num-
ber of digital supports, or share them on the Internet. At the same time, with
the wide availability of advanced image editing tools (e.g. Adobe Photoshop,
Gimp), modifying a digital photo, with little or no obvious signs of tamper-
ing, has become also very easy and widespread. For example, photo editing
is largely used in entertainment in order to improve image appearance, like in
the examples of figure 1. However, besides these benign cases, there are also
malicious ones. Photo editing can be used in journalism to modify the mean-
ing of an image, influencing the opinion of the readers, as shown in figures 2
and 3, or even in a court of law [2], to falsify evidences and possibly modify
the final rulings. Therefore, the problem arises of establishing the integrity of
digital images used as precious pieces of information in several fields of life.
Over the past dozen years, this problem has been faced by the scientific com-
munity in the field of digital image forensics and different methods have been
proposed to validate the content of a digital image. However, the many exist-
ing approaches, which comprise in turn a very large and ever growing number
of individual detection techniques, testify both the interest towards this prob-
lem and its complexity. In particular, image forgery detection deals with the
techniques used to prove whether a digital image is pristine or has been tam-
pered with, while image forgery localization concerns the techniques used to
localize the forged region in a tampered digital image. Recently, a large num-
ber of these approaches have been proposed in the literature under a variety of
scenarios.
A first category comprises active techniques for image authentication,
which are based on the use of watermarks [54] and signatures [112]. In the
first case, the watermark is embedded into the image (possibly originating
some small distortions), while in the latter, the signature is attached to the
1
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Figure 1: Examples of celebrities before-after the photo editing [1].
Figure 2: Right: a digital image forgery of an Iranian missile test ap-
peared on the front page of many major newspapers in 2008. A mis-
sile was digitally added to the image in order to conceal a missile on the
ground that did not fire. Left: the pristine image used to create the forgery.
[2].
image as a side information. Although these methods are very effective, they
can be applied only when the digital source is protected at the origin, which is
probably a minority of the cases of interest.
Therefore, there has been a steadily growing interest on passive techniques
which retrieve traces of manipulations from the image itself, with no need of
collaboration on the part of the user. These techniques in fact are based on the
observation that each step of the digital image life cycle (from the acquisition
process in the camera to its recording in a compressed format and its subse-
quent editing) leaves a trace in the image, that can be extracted by the algorithm
in order to reveal the tampering [88]. As noted by [39], these techniques use
one of the following four approaches.
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Figure 3: In September 2012, the National Review published a cover
photo in which the original slogan “Forward” was replaced with the word
“Abortion” [2].
Pixel-based techniques analyze the correlation between pixels either directly
in the spatial domain or in some transformed domain. For example some
methods are based on blur inconsistency [96], or on revealing traces caused by
resampling [63], which is a necessary operation whenever the forgery needs
to be rotated or rescaled by a certain factor. Other techniques are specifically
tailored to detect duplicated regions in the image (as in figure 2) [29, 62, 6].
Format-based methods, instead, exploit the usual adoption of some lossy
compression scheme, like JPEG. Several forgery detection techniques rely
on the traces left by multiple compression. In fact, when a JPEG image is
modified and saved again in JPEG format, specific artifacts appear as a result
of the multiple quantization processes, suggesting the presence of some forms
of tampering [74, 21, 14].
Camera-based techniques take advantage of peculiar traces left during
the acquisition phase, related to lens characteristics [106, 46], the color filter
array (CFA) pattern [90, 40], or the sensor array [77, 20]. These features,
specific of any different camera models, or even of individual cameras, can be
used as image signatures and exploited for forgery detection.
Phisics/geometric-based methods study higher-level inconsistencies, such as
the lighting of objects, shadows, or geometric features (dimension, position,
etc.) of objects present in the scene [60, 61, 76].
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Figure 4: Three forgeries drawn from the Forensics Challenge dataset
[3]. From left to right: forged image, mask of counterfeiting and original
image.
Note that, each method works in very specific hypotheses which limit its
applicability to a limited class of forgeries, and no ultimate all-encompassing
solution exists to the image forgery detection and localization problems.
Moreover, techniques proposed in the scientific literature are not always
correctly validated. Sometimes they are tested on very specific proprietary
datasets in favorable conditions, casting doubts on their actual performance
in more general scenarios. In addition, often neither the source code nor an
executable version are made available to guarantee reproducible research.
Therefore, it is difficult to assess objectively such methods and figure out their
performance in real-world applications [34].
Driven by these considerations, in 2013 the IEEE Information Forensics
and Security Technical Committee (IFS-TC) launched the First Image Foren-
sics Challenge [3], focused on image detection and localization (more detail in
the Appendix). This was a means to foster new research on these topics and
to compare the results of competing techniques on a large, publicly available
and well designed dataset. In figure 4 there are three examples drawn from the
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Forensics Challenge dataset. The first example is a splicing where an object
has been added in the image. The second one is a copy-move forgery where
a region of the image has been duplicated. The last example is based on in-
painting operations to remove an object from the image. One of the main out-
comes of the competition was that all the winning teams, including the GRIP
team of the University Federico II, used some form of fusion of various foren-
sic tools. In fact, only by using different and complementary techniques it is
possible to detect a wide spectrum of forgeries, and to localize the tampered
areas with good accuracy.
Motivated also by the experience gained in the IFS-TC Forensics Chal-
lenge, the work developed in this PhD thesis concerns different image
detection and localization tools, making reference to different approaches,
pixel-based, and camera-based. Therefore, the thesis is organized so as to
devote a chapter to each one of these techniques. In more detail,
Chapter 1 presents the techniques based on the camera sensor noise
(which can be considered as a sort of camera fingerprint), with special
emphasis on a novel method proposed to improve the spatial resolution of
the localization procedure. This method adopts a spatially adaptive filtering
technique, the guided filter, with weights computed over the analyzed image.
The experimental analysis shows that the proposed filtering strategy allows
for a much better performance, especially in the critical case of small forgeries.
Chapter 2 faces the problem of detecting and localizing copy-move
forgeries, where portions of the image are cut and pasted elsewhere in the
same image to duplicate or hide objects of interest. We focus on dense-field
techniques, which guarantee a superior performance with respect to their
keypoint-based counterparts, usually at the price of a much higher processing
time. The proposed technique overcomes the computational problem, thanks
to several innovative solutions concerning all steps of the process. Experi-
ments conducted on databases available online, prove the proposed technique
to be at least as accurate, generally more robust, and typically much faster,
than state-of-the-art dense-field references.
Chapter 3 addresses an innovative camera-based technique for tamper-
ing localization. This technique is based on dense local descriptors that are
computed for each block of the image, and are eventually compared with a
model to form a localization map of the forgery. Experiments show promising
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results in many situations of interest, often superior to those of the much more
complex camera-based techniques.
Chapter 1
PRNU-based localization of
small-size forgeries
I
n this chapter we will focus on techniques based on the photo-response
non-uniformity (PRNU) noise. These methods guarantee a good forgery
detection performance irrespective of the specific type of forgery, since they
do not detect the inserted object but rather the absence of the camera PRNU, a
sort of camera fingerprint, dealing successfully with forgeries that elude most
other detection strategies. The presence or absence of the camera PRNU pat-
tern is detected by a correlation test. Given the very low power of the PRNU
signal, however, the correlation must be averaged over a pretty large window,
reducing the algorithm’s ability to reveal small forgeries. To improve resolu-
tion, the correlation is estimated with a spatially adaptive filtering technique,
with weights computed over the image. Experiments prove that this strategy
allows for a much better detection performance in the case of small forgeries.
1.1 Introduction
Camera-based techniques discover image manipulations through peculiar
traces left by the camera during the acquisition of the picture. One of the
most promising to date relies on the photo response non-uniformity (PRNU)
noise. The PRNU arises from tiny imperfections in the silicon wafer used to
manufacture the imaging sensor [57]. These physical differences generate a
unique sensor pattern, specific of each individual camera, constant in time,
and independent of the scene, which can be therefore considered as a sort of
camera fingerprint and used as such to accomplish forgery detection or camera
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identification tasks. All the different types of tampering (copy-move, splicing,
retouching) remove the original PRNU from the target area, enabling the detec-
tion of the forgery irrespective of the type of attack. PRNU-based techniques
have proven quite robust to several forms of image processing [20, 27], in-
cluding rotation, rescaling, and JPEG compression at relatively low rates (e.g.,
Q=75). Given these precious properties, an intense research activity began on
this topic as soon as the potential of the approach was recognized.
The first PRNU-based technique was proposed [77] in 2006. Blocks ex-
tracted from the estimated PRNU of the target image are compared with ho-
mologous blocks of the camera PRNU (estimated in advance from a set of
sample images) and a tampering is declared whenever the normalized correla-
tion falls below a given threshold. However, since the PRNU is a very weak
signal, estimated by means of imperfect tools, its traces can be easily over-
whelmed by noise in some regions of the image characterized by saturation or
strong textures, leading to false alarms. Therefore, the same Authors propose
in [20] a new version which reduces false alarms by identifying the potentially
troublesome regions (through a predictor) and declaring them as genuine ir-
respective of the observed correlation index. Similar considerations guide the
algorithm proposed in [75], where only regions with high signal quality are
used, discarding those heavily deteriorated by irrelevant noise. In [68] a strat-
egy to reduce the interference of scene details on the PRNU is proposed, while
in [43] the suppression of non-unique artifacts is considered. These include,
for example, JPEG block artifacts, and CFA interpolation artifacts, both char-
acterized by regular ”linear” spatially periodic patterns, relatively easy to cor-
rect [69]. Non-unique artifacts may lead to wrong results, especially in camera
identification [48], because of the increased similarity between the PRNU fin-
gerprints of a different devices with similar characteristics. In [108], canonical
correlation analysis is used to increase the reliability of the decision variables.
A better method for PRNU estimation based on nonlocal filtering is proposed
in [24] and more recently in [26, 27] there is the reformulation of PRNU-based
forgery detection as a Bayesian estimation problem.
The PRNU pattern is a very weak signal, it can be reliably detected only by
jointly processing a large number of image samples, through a sliding-window
analysis. The size of the sliding-window dictates therefore the effective reso-
lution of the algorithm, causing forgeries smaller than the analysis window to
remain often undetected. In [25], the authors resorted to a preliminary image
segmentation to adapt the analysis window to the shape of candidate forgeries.
Segmentation, however, is itself a source of errors, and the experimental anal-
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ysis proved the heavy impact of such errors on performance. For this reason,
the approach proposed in [23] replaces hard segmentation with a more flexible
soft-segmentation strategy. In this chapter we will study in deep this approach
that uses adaptive weights in the analysis window, computed on the basis of im-
age content. A fast and effective implementation of this concept is obtained by
resorting to guided filters [55]. Experiments prove that this algorithm provides
much better results on critical small-size forgeries, with a negligible increase
in complexity.
1.2 Background
In this section, the basic algorithm proposed in [77, 20] is described. Let y ∈
RN be a digital image observed at the camera output, where yi indicates the
value at site i, either as a single color band or the composition of multiple color
bands. Let us assume, in a simplified model [20, 57], that y can be written as
yi = (1 + ki)xi + θi = xiki + xi + θi (1.1)
where x is the ideal noise-free image, k the camera PRNU, and θ an additive
noise term which accounts for all types of disturbances. The PRNU k is by now
our signal of interest, very weak w.r.t. both additive noise θ and ideal image x.
To increase the signal-to-noise ratio, we subtract from (1.1) an estimate of the
ideal image, x̂ = f(y), obtained by means of a denoising algorithm, obtaining
the so-called noise residual
ri = yi − x̂i = yiki + (xi − yi)ki + (xi − x̂i) + θi
= yiki + ni (1.2)
where, for convenience, k multiplies the observed image y rather than the un-
known origina, and all disturbances have been collected in a single noise term
n.
When a section of the image is tampered with, for example by replac-
ing it with material drawn from other regions, the PRNU term is cancelled.
Therefore, to decide about a possible forgery, PRNU-based techniques try to
discover whether the PRNU term is present or not. In the following we briefly
describe the technique proposed by Chen et al. [20], based on sliding-window
analysis.
As a preliminary step, the true camera PRNU pattern, k, must be reliably
estimated, which requires that either the target camera, or a large number of
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Noise residuals
?=
<γ1
(1) Estimation of camera PRNU.
(2) Localization of forgery.
Camera PRNU
Camera
Tampered pixels
Observed imageNoise residual
Set of images
Correlation field
Figure 1.1: Scheme of PRNU-based forgery localization techniques.
photos taken by it, are available. Of course, this hypothesis is not always satis-
fied in real-world situations, representing the main limitation of this approach.
The maximum likelihood estimate of the PRNU from M given images is com-
puted in [20] as
k̂i =
M∑
m=1
ym,irm,i/
M∑
m=1
y2m,i (1.3)
where the weighting terms ym account for the fact that dark areas of the image
present an attenuated PRNU and hence should contribute less to the overall
estimate. In the following, for the sake of simplicity, we will neglect the es-
timation error and will assume to know the camera PRNU perfectly, that is
k̂ = k.
Given k, the detection problem can be formulated as a binary test between
hypothesis H0 that the camera PRNU is absent (i.e. the pixel has been tam-
pered with) and hypothesis H1 that the PRNU is present (i.e. the pixel is gen-
uine): {
H0 : ri = ni
H1 : ri = zi + ni
(1.4)
with zi = yiki. The decision is based on the normalized correlation between
rWi and zWi , namely, the restrictions of r and z, respectively, to a window Wi
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centered on the target pixel:
ρi = corr
(
rWi , zWi
)
=
(rWi − rWi ) (zWi − zWi )
‖rWi − rWi‖ · ‖zWi − zWi‖
(1.5)
where  denotes inner product, and x indicates mean of x. The algorithm
proposed in [77] then compares the correlation with a threshold γ1
ûi =
{
0 ρi < γ1
1 otherwise
(1.6)
where ûi ∈ {0, 1} is the algorithm output, 0 for forgery and 1 for genuine pixel.
The threshold is selected according to the Neyman-Pearson criterion so as to
guarantee a suitably small false acceptance rate (FAR) Pr(ûi = 1 | ui = 0),
with ui ∈ {0, 1} the true pixel class. Once fixed the FAR, however, there
is no guarantee that the other type of error, the false rejection rate (FRR),
remain reasonably small. In fact, under hypothesis H1, the decision statistic is
influenced by the image content. Even in the absence of forgery, the correlation
might happen to be very low when the image is dark (since y multiplies the
PRNU), saturated (because of intensity clipping), or when denoising does not
perform well and some image content leaks into the noise residual. In figure
1.2(c) there is a correlation field computed on a genuine image, we can see that
the correlation is lower in the textured regions when denoising did not work
well. In [20] this problem is addresses by means of a “predictor” which, based
on local images features, such as texture, flatness and intensity, computes the
expected value ρ̂i of the correlation index under hypothesis H1, an example of
prediction is in figure 1.2(d). When ρ̂i is too low, indicating that no reliable
decision can be made, the pixel is always labeled as genuine, the less risky
decision, irrespective of the value of ρi. Therefore, the test becomes
ûi =
{
0 ρi < γ1 AND ρ̂i > γ2
1 otherwise
(1.7)
with γ2 chosen heuristically by the user. Better strategies are considered
in [26] and [27] where decisions are made jointly on all pixels based on a
Bayesian/MRF modeling.
Although the above description remains necessarily at a conceptual level,
it is worth going into some more detail for what concerns the decision statistic
of equation (1.5). Given the low, and spatially varying, signal-to-noise ratio
characterizing this problem, the two conditional pdf’s pρ|H0(·) and pρ|H1(·)
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(a) Pristine image (b) Camera PRNU
(c) Correlation field (d) Prediction of correlation
Figure 1.2: Correlation field and its prediction for pristine image.
can overlap significantly, causing large probabilities of error. To obtain a rea-
sonable separation between them, one is forced to compute the correlation over
a large window, for example, 128×128 pixels, as done in [20]. By so doing,
however, one is implicitly renouncing to detect forgeries much smaller than the
window size (or just much thinner). In these cases, in fact, the analysis win-
dow comprises pixels of both types, forged and genuine, providing a highly
unreliable decision statistic. In the original algorithm, in fact, detected forged
regions smaller than 64 × 64 pixels (one fourth of the window size) are can-
celed right away, as they are more easily generated by random errors than by
actual forgeries. Low resolution is therefore a major problem of this algorithm.
1.3 Methodology
To gain a better insight into our estimation problem let us elaborate some more
on equation (1.5) introducing some simplifications. First of all, we neglect
the means (which are typically negligible), and then focus only on the scalar
product on the numerator, considering that the terms at the denominator serve
only to normalize the correlation. Remember that z = yk is the camera PRNU
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multiplied point-wise by the input image and, likewise, r = hy+n is the noise
residual, with h the observed PRNU which might or might not coincide with
k. Therefore, if we divide all terms point-wise by y, we obtain eventually the
quantity
τi =
1
|Wi|
∑
j∈Wi
rj
yj
zj
yj
=
1
|Wi|
∑
j∈Wi
(hj +
nj
yj
)kj (1.8)
By defining a new noise field η = nk/y, and introducing generic weights ωij ,
eq.(1.8) becomes
τi =
∑
j∈Wi
ωij(hjkj + ηj) (1.9)
which can be interpreted as the linear filtering of the image hk affected by
the additive noise η. In [20] the weights are all equal hence, a simple boxcar
filtering is carried out.
Assuming that the whole analysis window is homogeneous, either genuine
(h = k) or forged (h 6= k) and, for the sake of simplicity, that y is constant over
the window, so that VAR[ηi] = σ2η , we can characterize the random variable τ
E[τ ] =
{ 〈k2〉i h = k
0 h 6= k (1.10)
VAR[τ ] = σ2η
∑
j
ω2ij (1.11)
where 〈k2〉 is the power of the camera PRNU estimated over Wi. In this con-
dition, using uniform weights ωij = 1/|Wi| is indeed optimal, as it minimizes
the variance of the estimate, and maximizes the probability of deciding cor-
rectly. However, if the analysis window is heterogeneous, that is, part of the
pixels are genuine and part forged, the estimate will suffer a systematic bias,
namely, the means will not be 0 or 〈k2〉 anymore, but some intermediate val-
ues, with an heavy impact on the decision reliability. In this case, the uniform
weights are no more optimal, in general, and one should instead reduce the
influence of pixels non homogeneous with the target by associating a small or
even null weight with them.
This is exactly the problem arising in the case of small-size forgeries. By
using a large analysis window with fixed weights we happen to include pix-
els of different nature, and the decision variable becomes strongly biased and
basically useless, even in favourable (bright, smooth, unsaturated) areas of the
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image. If we could find and include in the estimation only predictors homo-
geneous with the target, all biases would disappear, although at the cost of an
increased estimation variance.
The bias / variance trade-off is indeed well-known in the denoising lit-
erature. This problem has received a great deal of attention, recently, in the
context of nonlocal filtering [37, 38, 33], the current state of the art in denois-
ing, where predictor pixels are weighted based on their expected similarity
with the target. The similarity, in its turn, is estimated by comparing patches
of pixels centered, respectively, on the target and on each candidate predictor
pixel: when the patch surrounding a predictor is similar to the target patch, the
predictor is assumed to be similar to the target, and a large weight is associated
with it. This approach cannot work as is with our noise-like input image, rz, as
it lacks the geometrical structures that help computing a meaningful similar-
ity measure. However, we can take advantage of the original observed image
y, using it as a “pilot” (again a well-known concept in denoising) to compute
similarities, and applying the resulting weights in the actual filtering of the rz
field.
Unfortunately, nonlocal filtering, with its intensive patch-based process-
ing, is characterized by high computational complexity, which becomes un-
acceptable in our case, where the weak PRNU signal calls for large filtering
windows. We resort therefore to a different implementation of this basic idea,
based on guided filtering, a recently proposed [55] technique which imple-
ments nonlocal filtering concepts by leveraging heavily on the use of a pilot
image associated with the target image (see Fig.1.3).
We recall here the basics of guided filtering following closely the develop-
ment and notation used in [55], and referring the reader to the original paper
for a more detailed treatment. Let p be the image to be filtered, q the filter
output, and I a pilot image assumed to bear valuable information on p. We
consider linear filtering, in the form
qi =
∑
j
ωijpj (1.12)
Then, we assume that, locally to each pixel i, q depends linearly on I , that is
qj = aiIj + bi, ∀j ∈ Ωi (1.13)
where Ωi is a square window of radius R centered on i. The parameters ai and
bi are chosen to minimize over Ωi the squared error between observed image
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Iaq i ∇⋅=∇
Input p
Output q
Guide I
Figure 1.3: Scheme of guided filtering [55].
and model
(ai, bi) = arg min
(a,b)
∑
j∈Ωi
[(aiIj + bi − pj)2 + εa2i ] (1.14)
with ε a regularizing parameter that penalizes large values of a. The optimal
values are
ai =
1
|Ωi|
∑
j∈Ωi
Ij pj − I¯i p¯i
σ2i + ε
(1.15)
bi = p¯i − aiI¯i (1.16)
where p¯i and I¯i indicate the average of p and I over Ωi, and σ2i is the variance
of I over Ωi. By substituting the optimal values back into (1.13) we obtain
an estimate of qj for all output pixels in the window Ωi. Each of these pixels,
however, falls in several such windows, and hence, to obtain the final filtered
value, we average all such estimates
qj =
1
|Ωj |
∑
i∈Ωj
(aiIj + bi) = a¯ Ij + b¯ (1.17)
which is the final expression of the linear filtering process of p guided by the
pilot image I under the local linear model (1.13).
Fig.1.4 shows an example of application of guided filtering where a picture
taken without flash is denoised using its flash version as guidance. The main
reason for reporting above all the intermediate expressions is to point out that
all the computation amounts to a few boxcar filtering, applied to p, I , I2, a,
and b, and carried out by integral image techniques with negligible complexity.
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(a) Input: no-flash image (b) Output of guided filter



(c) Guide: flash image (d) Masks: weights adapt to the lo-
cal guide content
Figure 1.4: An application of guided filtering to denoise a no-flash image
under the guidance of its flash version. [55]
For our algorithm [23], of course, the input image is the product rz, the
output is the decision statistic ρ, while the pilot (scalar) image can be a combi-
nation of the color bands of the original image, y or its denoised version x, or
any suitable field of features extracted from these images. By tuning the two
parameters of the filter, the window radius R and the regularizing parameter
, the influence of the pilot image in the filtering process can be modulated at
will.
1.4 Experimental evaluations
To prove the potential of the proposed approach we begin by showing, in
Fig.1.6, a few sample images and the corresponding correlation fields. The
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image on the first row presents a large forgery, easily detectable in both the
correlation fields (last two columns) as the region is much darker than in the
predicted field (middle column). On the second and third row, instead, we
have quite small forgeries, which leave little or no trace in the field computed
by boxcar filtering, while are clearly detectable in the field obtained by guided
filtering. Although these last examples are very favourable for the guided fil-
tering approach, due to the high contrast between forgeries and background,
they make clear that the original image can help making a better decision.
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Figure 1.5: ROCs obtained with boxcar and guided filtering with forg-
eries of size: 48×48, 64×64, 96×96, and 128×128 pixels.
A more extensive experimental analysis is presented in Fig.1.5 where we
show the receiver operating curves (ROC) obtained using the original boxcar
filtering and the proposed guided filtering. To ensure a fair comparison, the al-
gorithm proposed in [20] is used in all cases, with its wavelet-based denoising
filter [80] and the two-threshold test, and we change only the way the corre-
lation field is computed. In particular, for guided filtering we consider three
implementations, using as pilots, respectively, i) the grayscale version of the
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original image y, ii) the RGB version of the same image, and iii) the vectorial
image composed by the four features [20] used to design the correlation pre-
dictor. We use a test set of 200 uncompressed 768×1024-pixel images with
a square forgery at the center, drawn at random from a different image. The
camera (a Canon EOS-450D) PRNU is estimated off-line on a separate train-
ing set, used also to design the predictor. Each ROC is the upper envelope of
pixel-level (PD, PFA) points obtained as the algorithm parameters vary. For
guided filtering we used ε =0.16 and R =32, which corresponds to an anal-
ysis window of 128×128. This window size is also used for boxcar filtering,
and in all cases, to allow a fair comparison, the minimum size of acceptable
detected forgeries was lowered to 32×32 pixels. Comparison is carried out
separately for very-small, small, medium and large forgeries. With forgeries
of dimension 48×48 pixels and 64×64 pixels (first two graphs), guided fil-
tering guarantees a large performance improvement over boxcar filtering, syn-
thesized by the area under curve (AUC) figure which grows from 0.63 to 0.78
in the first case and from 0.71 to over 0.85 in the second. With medium-size
forgeries, 96×96 pixels, the performance gain is much more limited, with the
AUC growing from 0.85 to 0.90, and becomes almost negligible, as expected,
with larger 128×128 forgeries. No significant difference is observed, instead,
as the pilot image changes, with the RGB pilot only slightly preferable to the
others.
1.5 Conclusions
We proposed a new strategy to improve the resolution of PRNU-based forgery
detection techniques. The basic idea is to exploit the image structure to better
estimate the correlation field on which decisions are based. This is obtained
here by resorting to the guided filtering approach, obtaining a very fast algo-
rithm, characterized by a performance much superior to the reference tech-
nique when small forgeries are involved. In the ongoing research, we are ex-
perimenting with other pilot images, studying in more depth the dependance
on the algorithm parameters, and assessing performance in a wide variety of
conditions, including various forms of distortion, and JPEG compression.
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Chapter 2
Efficient dense-field copy-move
forgery detection
A
very common type of manipulation is the copy-move forgery. In this
case one or more regions of an image are cut and pasted elsewhere, in
the same image, in order to duplicate or hide objects of interest. In fig.2.1,
there are two examples of copy-move forgeries. In the first case (top row), an
object has been duplicated. In the second example, a smooth region has been
duplicated to cover an undesired detail. In fact, these forgeries are extremely
simple to perform. In particular the forged images in fig.2.1 have been made
through the clone stamp tool availble in modern image editing tools, such as
Photoshop or Gimp. Detecting these forgeries, however, can be challenging,
especially in the occlusive case, where pieces of smooth background are du-
plicated. Indeed, in the last years many papers have dealt with this problem, as
reported in the review paper [5]. In this chapter, we present a new algorithm
for the accurate detection and localization of copy-move forgeries, based on
rotation-invariant features computed densely on the image [35, 36]. This pro-
posal, tested on databases available online, is very efficient and accurate.
2.1 Related work
All detection algorithms proposed to detect copy-move forgeries follow a com-
mon pipeline [29] based on three steps
• feature extraction: a suitable feature is computed for each pixel of inter-
est, expressing the image behavior in its neighborhood;
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Figure 2.1: Examples of copy-move forgeries. The genuine images on
the left and the forged images on the right.
• matching: the best matching of each pixel is computed, based on the
associated feature;
• post-processing: the offset field, linking pixels with their nearest neigh-
bors, is filtered and processed in order to reduce false alarms.
These operations can be carried out for each pixel of the image, generating
thus a dense offset field, or for just some selected keypoints, in which case the
field is sparse. Keypoint-based methods, working on a relatively small set of
pixels, are usually much faster than those based on dense matching. There-
fore, they can afford to compute long and complex features to associate with
the keypoints, characterized by rotation/scale invariance, like SIFT [87, 7],
SURF [95], LBP [110], DAISY [53], or even robust to some geometric trans-
formations, like in [62, 19]. Unfortunately, they are intrinsically less accurate
than dense-field methods, especially when copy-moves involve only smooth
regions, which is typically the case with occlusive forgeries. This performance
gap, which appears clearly in the benchmarking paper [29], is the main reason
driving us to focus on the dense-field approach.
The obvious problem, in this case, is complexity, since all pixels require
the three phases of feature extraction, matching, and post-processing. There-
fore, feature extraction is required to be intrinsically simple, and to produce
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features as short as possible to speed-up the matching phase. Using RGB val-
ues is a possible choice [67], but the resulting features tend to be unneces-
sarily long, and performance may be severely affected by JPEG compression,
noise addition, and other common distortions. In the literature, to improve ro-
bustness, features are typically extracted through some transforms, like DCT
[45, 104, 103], Wavelet [83], PCA [78], SVD [109], reducing also their length,
thanks to the decorrelation of coefficients. Such features, however, do not per-
form well in the presence of rescaling and rotation. Therefore, a significant
effort has been devoted, recently, towards the definition of features that deal
satisfactorily with these situations. Circular harmonic transforms are well-
suited to provide rotation-invariance, and several possibilities have been tested
to this end, including Zernike moments [91], and polar sine and cosine trans-
forms [71, 70]. As for scale-invariance, research has mostly focused on varia-
tions of the Fourier-Mellin Transform [11, 59, 100, 101], based on a log-polar
sampling. The same sampling scheme is also carried out directly in the spatial
domain in [16], producing a simple one-dimensional descriptor.
Besides feature selection, in the literature much attention has been devoted
to the matching phase itself. In fact, plain exhaustive search is prohibitive due
to its huge complexity, and faster techniques must be devised to produce the
offset field in a reasonable time. A significant speed-up can be obtained only
renouncing exact matching, and adopting some approximate nearest-neighbor
search strategy, in which case accuracy becomes a further aspect of interest.
Some techniques [11, 16] rely on simple lexicographic sorting, but this ap-
proach is very sensitive to noise and other forms of impairment. Robustness
improves significantly with more sophisticated fast search techniques, like kd-
trees [84], used in [67, 29], or locality sensitive hashing [47], considered in
[91, 71]. These state-of-the-art matching techniques, however, are designed
to work for very generic problems, like the retrieval of documents over the
Internet. Therefore, they do not take into account a major circumstance of in-
terest in this context, namely, that the we are looking for a nearest-neighbor
field, where features are extracted from a real-world image, and are not just a
collection of unrelated queries. This observation is at the core of [36, 35] in
which we propose an efficient and accurate technique for copy-move detection
and localization, which deals successfully also with a number of geometric
transformations.
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2.2 Proposed method
Our method, proposed in [36], follows the general workflow considered in
[29], but proposes innovative and efficient solutions for most of the key steps of
the workflow. Matching of dense features, in particular, is carried out through
the PatchMatch algorithm [9], specific for nearest-neighbor search over im-
ages, which greatly reduces the processing time while providing an accurate
and regular offset field. Efficiency is pursued also in the other processing steps,
by selecting compact, low-complexity features, and by implementing a simple
and reliable post-processing scheme, which fully exploits the smoothness of
PatchMatch offset field. As a result, our dense-field technique turns out to be
nearly as fast as keypoint-based techniques, but much more reliable than them.
Moreover, by selecting suitable scale and/or rotation-invariant features, higher
robustness w.r.t. a number of geometric distortions is also achieved. With
reference to the general scheme recalled in Section 2.1, we will first focus
on efficient matching, and post-processing; then we will consider and discuss
several features with scale-invariance and rotation-invariance properties.
2.2.1 Computing a dense NNF
Let
I = {I(s) ∈ RK , s ∈ Ω} (2.1)
be an image defined over a regular rectangular grid Ω. With each pixel1, s,
we associate a feature vector, f(s), which describes the P -pixel image patch
centered on s. In the simplest case, f(s) might just be the KP -vector formed
by stacking all image values observed in the patch. More often, to improve
efficiency, the feature is a compact description of the patch, with length much
smaller than KP .
Given a suitable measure of distance between features, D(f ′, f ′′), we de-
fine the nearest neighbor of s as the pixel, s′ ∈ Ω, s′ 6= s, which minimizes
this distance over the whole image. Rather than the nearest neighbor field
(NNF) itself, in the following we will often consider the equivalent offset field,
{δ(s), s ∈ Ω}, where
δ(s) = arg min
φ:s+φ∈Ω,φ 6=0
D(f(s), f(s+ φ)) (2.2)
and, of course, the NN is s′ = s+ δ(s).
1To the extent possible, to keep a light notation, we avoid double indices and boldface, using
the single normal-type variable s to indicate pixel location.
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Finding the exact NNF is computationally very demanding, even for a rel-
atively small image, since the complexity grows quadratically with the image
size. Most real-world applications, however, do not really need the exact NN,
and perform almost as well with some good approximation of it. Finding an
approximate NN can be orders of magnitude less expensive than finding the
exact one, with a speeding factor depending on feature statistics and on the
desired accuracy. As a matter of fact, a large number of techniques have been
proposed in recent years for this task, the most promising of which are based on
kd-trees and on hashing. Indeed, some of these techniques have been already
applied in the context of copy-move detection, as in [29], where feature match-
ing is carried out through the kd-tree based methods of the FLANN package
[84], or in [91], where locality-sensitive hashing [47, 8] is used.
These techniques, however, are not really suited for the problem under
analysis, as they consider each feature to match as an independent query,
neglecting altogether the spatial regularity typical of natural images. Image
smoothness and self-similarity, instead, imply that the NNs of close pixels are
very often spatially close themselves. By exploiting this simple property one
can both reduce the computational cost and improve the quality of the final
NNF. Indeed, the search can be accelerated by using the offsets of neighbor-
ing pixels as initial guesses for the current one. This approach is well-known
in the denoising literature, where it is exploited for nonlocal filtering tech-
niques based on block-matching. Moreover, by resorting to spatial prediction,
smoother offset fields are automatically obtained. This is extremely valuable
in the context of copy move detection, as it allows one to avoid complex (and
time-consuming) post-processing algorithms to regularize the field afterwards.
Based on these considerations, we resort here to a technique recently pro-
posed for the specific problem of fast NNF computation over images.
A. The PatchMatch algorithm
PatchMatch [9] is a fast randomized algorithm which finds dense approximate
nearest neighbor matches between image patches.
Initialization. The offset field is initialized at random, as
δ(s) = U(s)− s (2.3)
where U(s) is a bi-dimensional random variable, uniform over the image sup-
port Ω. We note explicitly, here, that δ(s) = 0 is obviously discarded, as it
corresponds to a trivial and useless solution. Likewise, since we are looking
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Figure 2.2: Offset propagation. Initially (left), most offsets are wrong
(red); a random good offset (green) propagates along the scanning order
(center) until the whole copy-moved region is covered (right).
for matches relatively far apart from the target, we exclude all offsets smaller
than a given threshold, ‖δ(s)‖∞ < TD1, a condition applied implicitly in all
further developments. Most of the initial random offsets are just useless, but
it is very likely that a certain number of them will be optimal or near-optimal.
The main idea of PatchMatch is to quickly propagate such good offsets, updat-
ing iteratively the whole field. In the generic iteration, there are two phases:
propagation and random search.
Propagation. In this phase the image is raster scanned top-down and left-
to-right, and for each pixel s the current offset is updated as
δ(s) = arg min
φ∈∆P (s)
D(f(s), f(s+ φ)) (2.4)
where ∆P (s) = {δ(s), δ(sr), δ(sc)}, and sr and sc are the pixels preceding
s, in the scanning order, along rows and columns, respectively. In practice,
the algorithm checks whether the offsets associated with the causal neighbors
improve the matching quality w.r.t. the current one. Therefore, if a good offset
is available for a given pixel of a region with constant offset, this will very
quickly propagate, filling the whole region below and to the right of it. To
avoid biases, the scanning order is then reversed (bottom-up and right-to-left)
at every other iteration. In Fig.2.2, using a simple toy example, we provide
some insight into the rationale of this procedure for the copy-move detection
application. On the left, some of the initial offsets are shown (only on a bowl-
ing pin, to avoid cluttering the figure), which are all wrong (red) except for
one of them (green), which is correct by chance. After the first iteration of
the algorithm, the correct offset propagates to the bottom-right part of the pin
(center), and to all of it after the second iteration (right). With more complex
geometries, the complete propagation might require some more iterations.
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Random search. The above propagation procedure is obviously greedy,
and as such suboptimal, depending on the quality of the random initializa-
tion. Therefore, to minimize the risk of being trapped in local minima, af-
ter the updating of equation (2.4), a random search phase is also considered,
based on a random sampling of the current offset field. The candidate offsets
δi(s), i = 1, . . . , L are chosen as
δi(s) = δ(s) +Ri (2.5)
where Ri is a bi-dimensional random variable, uniform over a square grid of
radius 2i−1, excluding the origin. In practice, most of these new candidates are
pretty close to δ(s), but large differences are also allowed, with small proba-
bility. The random-search updating reads therefore as
δ(s) = arg min
φ∈∆R(s)
D(f(s), f(s+ φ)) (2.6)
where ∆R(s) = {δ(s), δ1(s), . . . , δL(s)}.
For an image of, say, 1024×1024 pixels, L ≤ 10. Considering that the
procedure typically converges after a few iterations, the whole computational
load is in the order of 102 feature distance computation per pixel, as opposed to
106 for full-search, which fully explains the algorithm speed. Of course, Patch-
Match relies on the implicit hypothesis that the NNF is mostly regular, and in
particular regular over the regions of interest where a match is looked for, oth-
erwise the crucial propagation step would be basically ineffective. However,
this is exactly the condition encountered in copy-move detection.
B. Modifying PatchMatch to deal with rotation and rescaling
The basic algorithm described above does not deal with scale changes and
rotations, which are instead very common in copy-move image tampering.
In a subsequent paper [10], however, the same authors of PatchMatch gen-
eralized and extended it under several respects, including the ability to search
across scales and rotation angles, going beyond mere translations, and to match
patches based on arbitrary descriptors and distances, rather than just the Eu-
clidean norm of original patches used in the basic version.
The solution proposed in [10] is straightforward: rather than analyzing
only the 2d space spanned by the offset components (δ1, δ2), a 4d space is
considered, comprising two further dimensions, scale, α, and rotation θ. All
steps are then carried out as before, with obvious adjustments of minor signif-
icance, except for two main differences:
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1. given the current values of α and θ, the target patch is suitably
rescaled/rotated, interpolated and resampled, to be comparable with the
original one;
2. likewise, in the propagation step, the candidate offsets are not just copied
from the neighbors’ offsets, but computed based on them and on the
local transformation identified by α and θ.
The generalized algorithm preserves thus the simplicity of the original ver-
sion, an appealing property. However, it presents some significant drawbacks.
First of all, the computational complexity increases sharply, not only for the
need to carry out patch interpolation but also for the increased number of
iterations necessary to converge in a 4d search space. Moreover, the algo-
rithm is not amenable to be used with compact features, like those described
in Section 2.2.3, renouncing their potential for higher descriptive power and
scale/rotation invariance, as well as the reduced complexity associated with
their shorter length. Last, but not least, experiments on copy-move forgery de-
tection [35] show generalized PatchMatch to be much less reliable than the ba-
sic version in the fundamental case of simple rigid translation, causing a signif-
icant loss in performance. Our conjecture is that with an higher-dimensionality
optimization space, a large number of suboptimal matchings are available,
which trap the algorithm into local minima. This problem should be solved
by the random search phase but random sampling becomes too sparse in such
a large space, and hence less effective.
Given these dismaying results, in terms of both accuracy and complexity,
in [35] we proposed a different modification of the basic PatchMatch algo-
rithm, based on the use of scale/rotation invariant features. In fact, numerous
such features have been proposed in recent years to describe image patches,
solving in advance (as far as invariance holds) the problem of matching patches
subject to such transformations.
Thanks to the use of invariant features, the basic algorithm needs be mod-
ified exclusively for what concerns the propagation phase, by changing the set
of candidate offsets available for updating. In the original algorithm, the cur-
rent offset for pixel s is compared with two other candidate offsets, δ(sr) and
δ(sc), which are simply the causal zero-order predictions of δ(s) along image
rows and columns, renamed here accordingly as δ˜0r(s) and δ˜0c(s), respec-
tively. Of course, zero-order predictors are effective only in regions character-
ized by a constant offset, corresponding to copy-moves with rigid translations.
Rotated, rescaled, and rotated-rescaled copy-moves, instead, are described by
2.2. Proposed method 29
linearly varying offset fields, as shown in Fig.2.3, in which case, first-order
predictors can be expected to work correctly.
Therefore we enlarge the set of candidates in (2.4) considering both zero-
order and first-order predictors
δ˜0x(s) = δ(sx)
δ˜1x(s) = 2δ(sx)− δ(sxx) (2.7)
x ∈ {r, d, c, a}
where sxx is the pixel preceding sx along direction x in the scanning order (see
Fig.2.4), and we include also the diagonal and antidiagonal directions, d and
a, respectively, obtaining eventually the enlarged set of predicted offsets
∆P (s) = {δ(s), δ˜0r(s), δ˜0d(s), δ˜0c(s), δ˜0a(s),
δ˜1r(s), δ˜1d(s), δ˜1c(s), δ˜1a(s)} (2.8)
With this modification, whenever a correct offset field is found over a cou-
ple of neighboring pixels it will quickly propagate to the rest of the interested
region within two iterations. Moreover, thanks to the zero-order predictor,
and to the random search phase, it is not difficult to reach the initial condition
which triggers the propagation.
Some comments are in order. First of all, the complexity of the proposed
version is very close to that of the basic one, as only the propagation phase is
modified, and in a quite inexpensive way. Moreover, the opportunity to adopt
compact features in place of pixel values grants a stronger efficiency gain. As
for accuracy, using features that are scale and rotation invariant, we can match
a very general class of copy-moves. It could be pointed out that most features
proposed in the literature are only rotation-invariant. However, PatchMatch
Figure 2.3: Offsets vary linearly over the copy-moved region in the pres-
ence of rotation (left), rescaling (center), or both (right).
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Figure 2.4: Predictor geometry for direct scanning. Blue pixels are used
to build various zero- and first-order predictors for the offset of pixel s
(red).
exhibits a remarkable robustness w.r.t. limited scale changes [35], thanks to
the random search phase. Hence, one can explore the scale dimension through
a brute-force approach in a limited number of steps, a non-elegant solution,
viable only thanks to PatchMatch speed, which proved to be very effective
in practical applications [31, 32]. Finally, it should be pointed out that, on the
wake of PatchMatch, other dense-field techniques have been proposed recently
[65, 86], providing further improvements in search efficiency by replacing the
random search phase with some smarter initialization, based on fast approxi-
mate NN search techniques. This is a very active field of research, and we are
confident that some of these ideas may be included in future versions of our
algorithm.
2.2.2 Post-processing based on dense linear fitting
Ideally, the offset field obtained through feature matching should be mostly
chaotic except for some large smooth regions with linear behavior in corre-
spondence of cloned objects. In practice, because of noise, compression, ge-
ometric deformations, illumination changes, look-alike regions, the computed
offset field rarely follows this model and some post-processing is necessary to
1. regularize the offset field to increase the probability of detecting actual
copy-moves;
2. add some suitable constraints to reduce the probability of false alarms.
The first problem is especially challenging, and previous papers tackled it
through sophisticated and relatively slow methods, such as the well-known
RANSAC [91] or SATS [28]. In our case, however, thanks to the implicit fil-
tering enacted by PatchMatch, the offset field is regular enough to consider a
simpler approach, based on dense linear fitting (DLF).
2.2. Proposed method 31
We want to fit, in a suitableN -pixel neighborhood of s, the true offset field
δ(s) through a linear (more precisely, affine) model
δ̂(si) = Asi, i = 1, . . . , N (2.9)
with the parameters of the transformation, A, set so as to minimize the sum of
squared errors w.r.t. the true data
2(s) =
N∑
i=1
‖δ(si)− δ̂(si)‖2 (2.10)
Although the offset field is bi-dimensional, the model parameters can be opti-
mized independently for each of the two components, so in the following lines,
in order to simplify notations, we will treat δ(s) as a single component field.
With this understanding, we can write the problem as
aopt = arg min
a
‖δ − Sa‖2 (2.11)
where δ = [δ(s1), δ(s2), . . . , δ(sN )]T is the vector of offsets output by the
matching phase, a = [a0, a1, a2]T is the vector of parameters that identifies the
affine transform, and S is the N × 3 matrix of the homogeneous coordinates
of all pixels in the neighborhood
S =

1 s11 s12
1 s21 s22
...
1 sN1 sN2
 (2.12)
so that,
δ̂(si) = a0 + a1si1 + a2si2, i = 1, . . . , N (2.13)
This is a well known multiple linear regression problem [66], with solution
aopt = (STS)−1ST δ (2.14)
The corresponding sum of squared errors (SSE) is therefore
2(s) = ‖δ − S(STS)−1ST δ‖2
= ‖(I −H)δ‖2
= δT (I −H)δ (2.15)
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where we have exploited the fact that H = S(STS)−1ST is symmetric and
idempotent (HH = H). If the coordinates in (2.12) are taken relative to s,
and the neighborhood has constant shape, the matrix H does not depend on
s, hence computing the SSE reduces to evaluating the quadratic form (2.15)
for the two offset components. However, the processing cost can be further
reduced by decomposing the rank-3 matrix H as
H = QQT , Q = [q1, q2, q3] (2.16)
where qj is a column vector of length N , and hence
2(s) = (δT δ)− (δT q1)2 − (δT q2)2 − (δT q3)2 (2.17)
computed through a few filtering operations and some products.
We can now outline the complete post-processing procedure, which com-
prises the following steps:
1. median filtering on a circular window of radius ρM ;
2. computation of the fitting error, 2(s), w.r.t. a least-squares linear model
over a circular neighborhood of radius ρN ;
3. thresholding of 2(s) at level T 2 ;
4. removal of couples of regions closer than TD2 pixels;
5. removal of regions smaller than TS pixels;
6. mirroring of detected regions;
7. morphological dilation with a circular structuring element of radius
ρD = ρM + ρN .
As already said in Section 2.2.1, a locally linear model is certainly ap-
propriate for the copy-moves considered in this chapter, but minimum mean-
square error (MMSE) fitting is very sensitive to outliers. Therefore, before
the DLF, we carry out a median filtering process, which removes outliers, but
leaves the signal unaltered where it has a linear behavior. In step 3, the im-
age is segmented to single out candidate copy-moved regions. Here, to keep
complexity limited, a simple thresholding is considered, but plenty of meth-
ods are available to improve this process. Steps 4 and 5 are meant to remove
matchings obtained by chance. Spurious matchings abound in natural images
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Figure 2.5: Post-processing steps: (a) original forged image, (b) magni-
tude of offsets, (c) median filtering, (d) fitting error 2(s) (dB), (e) thresh-
olding of 2(s), (f) final mask.
34 2. Efficient dense-field copy-move forgery detection
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
ρ
ZM
 ra
di
al
 fu
nc
tio
ns
 
 
n=0 ; m=0
n=1 ; m=1
n=2 ; m=0
n=3 ; m=1
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
ρ
PC
T 
ra
di
al
 fu
nc
tio
ns
 
 
n=0
n=1
n=2
n=3
(b)
0re
a
l p
ar
t o
f F
M
T
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
ρ
im
ag
e 
pa
rt 
of
 F
M
T
n = −5.77
n = −2.88
n =  0.00
n =  2.88
n =  5.77
(c)
Figure 2.6: Radial profiles of some CHTs: Zernike (left), PCT (center),
FMT (right).
because of repeated patterns or uniform background. In the first case, how-
ever, similar details are typically quite small, and can be removed based on the
size constraint. In the second case, we exploit the fact that background regions
are generally not as uniform as they appear. Gradual luminance changes im-
ply that, in a uniform background region, patches similar to the target are also
close to it, and hence the additional constraint on distance eliminates these re-
gions. It goes by itself that an image portraying multiple replicas of the same
object can still give rise to false alarms, especially if scale and rotation invari-
ant features are used. Once we decide that pixel s belongs to a copy-move
region, it make sense to mark as copy-moved also pixel s + δ(s), which we
do in step 6. Finally, considering that both median filtering and model fitting
tend to erode the support of the copy-moved regions, in step 7 we restore them
through a complementary dilation.
The various steps of the procedure are illustrated In Fig.2.5 on a real-world
example.
2.2.3 Feature Extraction
A large number of features have been proposed in recent years for the pur-
pose of copy-move detection, and many of them have been considered in the
extensive experimental comparison carried out in [29]. Here, we will focus
on features based on the family of Circular Harmonic Transforms (CHT) [58]
which possess desirable invariance properties.
Let I(x, y) be a scalar image defined on a continuous space, (x, y) ∈ R2,
and let I(ρ, θ) be its representation in polar coordinates, with ρ ∈ [0,∞] and
θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. The CHT coefficients are evaluated by projecting the image over
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the basis functions Kn,m(ρ, θ) of the transform
FI(n,m) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ ∞
0
I(ρ, θ)K∗n,m(ρ, θ)ρ dρ dθ (2.18)
The basis functions have the form
Kn,m(ρ, θ) = Rn,m(ρ)
1√
2pi
ejmθ (2.19)
that is, they are obtained as the product of a radial profile Rn,m(ρ) and a cir-
cular harmonic. Therefore (2.18) can be rewritten as
FI(n,m) =
∫ ∞
0
ρR∗n,m(ρ)×
[
1√
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
I(ρ, θ)e−jmθdθ
]
dρ (2.20)
The integral in square brackets, let us call it Î(ρ), is the Fourier series of I(ρ, θ)
along the angle coordinate. Therefore, a rotation of θ0 radians in I contributes
just a phase term ejmθ0 in Î , which disappears if one takes the magnitude of
the coefficients, thereby obtaining rotation invariance.
The various CHTs differ in the radial profile. We consider three choices,
the Zernike Moments (ZM) [97], the Polar Cosine Transform (PCT) [105], and
the Fourier-Mellin Transform (FMT) [93]. Zernike radial functions are defined
as
Rn,m(ρ) =
(n−|m|)/2∑
h=0
Cn,m,hρ
n−2h (2.21)
for ρ ∈ [0, 1], with Cn,m,h suitable coefficients that ensure orthonormality of
the basis functions. Fig.2.6(a) shows some of these functions, chosen among
those with lowest order. In the PCT, the radial functions are just cosines with
argument ρ2,
Rn(ρ) = Cn cos(pinρ
2) (2.22)
limited again to ρ ∈ [0, 1], with normalizing coefficients Cn, some of which
are shown in Fig.2.6(b). In the FMT, instead, they are defined as
Rν(ρ) =
1
ρ2
ejν ln(ρ) (2.23)
Notice however that, in this case, the functions are non-zero for all ρ ≥ 0,
they diverge at the origin, and the parameter ν is continuous-valued. With
this choice, the integral (2.20) becomes just the Fourier transform of Î(ρ)
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after a coordinate remapping, while the whole FMT can be regarded as the
bi-dimensional Fourier transform of I in log-polar coordinates. As a conse-
quence, a scale change in I contributes only a phase in the FMT coefficients,
which disappears after taking the absolute value, granting also scale invariance.
Now, we have to translate these theoretical definitions into practical finite-
length features which characterize locally the image. These must be computed
on the available data, sampled on a discrete grid, preserving the invariance
properties. To this aim, we have to select a finite number of (n,m) couples,
define a suitable patch size and, for each pixel s, compute the FI(s)(n,m)
coefficients, by approximating the integral of (2.18) with a summations over
the patch centered on s. Eventually, the feature f(s) will be the collection of
the magnitudes of these coefficients.
The patch size must guarantee a good compromise between discrimination
and robustness. Patches too small might not catch the local image behavior,
while if too large they might loose resolution and lead to false alarms. Like-
wise, features should not be unnecessarily long, to avoid slowing down all
processing steps, but still expressive enough to allow correct matches. We will
not indulge in describing the preliminary experiments carried out to set these
quantities, selected values are reported in Tab.2.1. Patches of 16×16 or 24×24
pixels are used, with features of length 12 for Zernike, 10 for PCT, and 25 for
FMT, corresponding always to the lower order2 basis functions.
Let us focus, instead, on the approximation of the integral (2.18). A
straightforward solution is to resample the basis functions Kn,m(ρ, θ) on the
grid points (x, y) of the analysis patch, W , where the image is defined (see
Fig.2.7(a)), computing therefore
F ′I(n,m) =
∑
(x,y)∈W
I(x, y)K∗n,m(ρ(x, y), θ(x, y)) (2.24)
with ρ(x, y) =
√
x2 + y2 and θ(x, y) = ± arctan(y/x). However, an equally
viable solution is to resample the image on polar (or logpolar) coordinates (see
Fig.2.7(b)-(c)), and compute
F ′′I (n,m) =
∑
(ρ,θ)∈W
I(x(ρ, θ), y(ρ, θ))K∗n,m(ρ, θ)ρ
i (2.25)
with i = 1 for the polar grid and i = 2 for the logpolar one. This seemingly
minor difference has non-negligible consequences on performance, in partic-
ular on rotation invariance [102]. In fact, polar sampling guarantees perfect
2For FMT, ν = 2npi/ log(ρmax/ρmin), for n = 0,±1,±2.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.7: Examples of rectangular (a), polar (b) and log-polar (c) sam-
pling grids.
invariance for rotation angles multiple of the sampling step ∆θ, and a good
approximation of it in all other cases, provided ∆θ is not too large. On the
contrary, with rotation angles close to pi/4 ± kpi/2, features computed on the
cartesian grid can change significantly, undermining the invariance property, as
also shown in [72] where an accurate analysis of errors induced by sampling
is carried out.
In addition, the two solutions have the same computational efficiency,
since, given ρ and θ, the interpolated values I(ρ, θ) in (2.25) are computed
from available data points with fixed weights, falling back again to a filter-
ing of the form (2.24), only with different weights. We will therefore resort
to the polar sampling for both Zernike and PCT features, but keep also the
cartesian sampling as reference. For FMT, instead, we will obviously use a
log-polar sampling, aiming at scale invariance. However, we are forced to ex-
clude points too close to the origin [115], that is to the central pixel s, where
the radial functions diverge.
We note explicitly that CHT-based features have been already used for
forgery detection. Zernike moments, for example, have been adopted in
[92, 29, 91], with cartesian sampling, providing interesting results. Likewise,
the PCT has been investigated in [71], again with cartesian sampling. As for
FMT-based features they have been also already considered for forgery de-
tection [11], but with unimpressive results, as reported in [29]. However, the
implementation proposed in [11], inspired by [73], includes further process-
ing steps that disrupt the invariance properties, so useful for robust copy-move
detection. Similarly, in [100], the features are formed by taking some cross-
spectra, rather than the magnitude of the coefficients themselves.
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Figure 2.8: Three forged images with different levels of activity from the
FAU database. From top: smooth, rough, structured.
2.3 Experimental evaluations
In this section, we present the results of a number of experiments carried out
in order to fine tune the proposed technique and assess its performance w.r.t.
the state of the art. In order to guarantee reproducibility of results, our code
is available online3, and experiments are carried out on two databases also
available online. The database used in [29], which we will call FAU4 from now
on, comprises 48 images with realistic copy-move forgeries, some examples of
which are shown in Fig.2.8, classified as smooth, rough or structured. These
images are quite large, with typical size 3000×2400 pixels, with tampered
areas covering about 6% of each image, on average. We prepared a further
database5 composed by 80 images, again with realistic copy-move forgeries,
3http://www.grip.unina.it
4http://www5.cs.fau.de/
5http://www.grip.unina.it
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some of which are shown in Fig.2.9. All these images have size 768×1024
pixels, while the forgeries have arbitrary shapes, aimed at obtaining visually
satisfactory results, with size going from about 4000 pixel (less than 1% of the
image) to about 50000 pixels. In adding this new database, called GRIP from
now on, we wanted to enrich the experimental set available to the community,
and include also forgeries of relatively small size. However, we were also
motivated by the practical need to run in a reasonable time the large number of
experiments needed to fine-tune and validate the proposed technique in various
situations of interest.
Results are provided both at pixel level and image level. To assess synthet-
ically the image-level performance we use the F-measure, defined as
F =
2 TP
2 TP + FN + FP
(2.26)
where TP (true positive), FN (false negative), and FP (false positive) count,
respectively, the number of detected forged images, undetected forged images,
and wrongly detected genuine images. Similar definitions are used at pixel-
level for each image to obtain, after averaging on all images, the pixel-level
F-measure. At image level we measure, therefore, only the ability to correctly
recognize an image as forged or genuine, while the pixel-level measure ac-
counts also for localization accuracy. At pixel level we exclude from compu-
tation the pixels at the boundary between forgery and background, where the
transparency is set to an intermediate value between 0 and 1 to avoid artifacts.
Processing time is another key performance parameter, since reliable copy-
move detectors are known to be rather slow, a non-negligible problem with
images that become larger and larger as technology goes on. We will therefore
report also the average CPU time per image, measured on a computer with a
2GHz Intel Xeon processor, operating in single-thread modality.
Next subsection is devoted to analyze the proposed technique, while the
subsequent one compares performance with the state of the art.
2.3.1 Fine tuning of the proposed method
In the proposed technique there are a number of design choices and numeri-
cal parameters to be defined. After some preliminary experiments, we set all
parameters to the reasonable and non-critical values reported in Tab.2.1. The
number of PatchMatch iterations, Nit, however, deserves a deeper analysis,
since it can impact significantly on the overall performance. We pointed out
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Figure 2.9: Three forged images from the GRIP database with different
levels of activity. From top: smooth, mixed, textured.
already that a good offset field can be obtained after a small number of it-
erations, but how small is “small”, exactly, and what are the effects of this
choice on performance? To gain insight into this point, we ran a series of ex-
periments on our 80-image database, considering various situations of interest:
noise addition, JPEG compression, resizing and rotation. In these experiments,
we used the Zernike features with polar sampling, with the default parameters
of Tab.2.1. Results on accuracy are reported in Fig.2.10, and show that the
performance is already very good with as little as 4 iterations, with the only
exception of rotated forgeries, where increasing Nit to 8 or even 16 guaran-
tees some improvements, up to 0.1, for large angles. In Tab.2.2 we report
instead the CPU time. This is constant for feature extraction and nearly so
for post-processing, while it grows almost linearly with Nit for the matching
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param. value phase meaning
|W |C 16×16 F (x, y) samples in cartesian grid
|W |P 26×32 F (ρ, θ) s.s in polar grid (ρ ≤ 8)
|W |LP 26×32 F (ρ, θ) s.s in logpolar grid (ρ ≤ 12)
|f |Z 12 F length of Zernike features
|f |PCT 10 F length of PCT features
|f |FMT 25 F length of FMT features
Nit 4-16 M # PatchMatch iterations
TD1 8 M minimum length of offsets
TD2 50 PP minimum distance between clones
T 2 300 PP threshold on DLF error
TS 1200 PP minimum size of clones
ρM 4 PP radius of median filter
ρN 6 PP radius of DLF patch
ρD 10 PP radius for morphological dilation
Table 2.1: Relevant parameters for the various phases of the PM-based
technique and proposed setting.
phase, which weights heavily on the overall efficiency of the algorithm. With
Nit = 4, the proposed algorithm takes about 11 seconds/image, on the aver-
age, a time that almost doubles with Nit = 16. Larger values make no sense
as they have no effect on accuracy. Therefore, the user can be interested in
several profiles, from FAST (Nit = 4) with an overall processing time com-
petitive with that of keypoint-based techniques, but a much better accuracy, to
ACCURATE (Nit = 16), which guarantees the best performance at the cost of
a longer, but still reasonable, CPU time.
The other major choice available to the user concerns the type of feature
to use. Again, for each feature we set in advance the main parameters as re-
ported in Tab.2.1. The pixel-level curves shown in Fig.2.11, obtained with
Nit = 8, are quite close to one another. With all features, the proposed tech-
nique behaves very well on rigid copy-moves, with an F-measure going from
0.90 for FMT to 0.94 for Zernike-polar. Moreover, the performance degrades
in a similar manner for all features with increasing noise, compression ratio,
rescaling factor, and rotation angle. Some minor differences can be observed
for FMT, slightly better than the others for moderate rescaling factors, and for
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Nit Feat. Ext. Matching Post-Proc. Total
2
2.36 (0.48)
3.19 (0.32) 1.93 (0.18) 7.48 (0.66)
4 6.54 (0.96) 2.12 (0.30) 11.02 (1.49)
8 11.96 (1.68) 2.10 (0.25) 16.42 (2.00)
16 16.81 (1.51) 1.77 (0.31) 20.92 (1.85)
Table 2.2: CPU-time performance (seconds/image) vsNit using Zernike-
polar features; in parentheses the standard deviations.
Feature Feat. Ext. Matching Post-Proc. Total
ZM-cart 2.55 (0.52) 12.00 (1.70) 2.08 (0.25) 16.63 (2.02)
ZM-polar 2.36 (0.48) 11.96 (1.68) 2.10 (0.25) 16.42 (2.00)
PCT-cart 1.79 (0.29) 10.78 (1.48) 2.30 (0.32) 14.86 (1.66)
PCT-polar 1.74 (0.24) 10.79 (1.25) 2.16 (0.29) 14.69 (1.40)
FMT 9.82 (1.47) 15.23 (1.72) 1.80 (0.16) 26.86 (2.83)
Table 2.3: CPU-time performance (seconds/image) vs feature using
Nit = 8; in parentheses the standard deviations.
Zernike-cartesian, slightly worse at large-angle rotations.
With these results, processing time becomes again a key decision element.
Tab.2.3 shows the average CPU-time for the selected features with the default
parameters of Tab.2.1. It results that only the FMT feature presents a sig-
nificantly different (higher) processing time, due to the larger patch used to
compute the feature, and the longer features themselves.
Before comparing results with the state of the art, we present some exper-
iments to assess the impact of each of the proposed improvements. In par-
ticular, keeping fixed the parameters selected before and using the Zernike-
polar features when applicable, we consider a baseline reference technique
with basic PatchMatch and SATS, two intermediate versions where only the
matching phase or the post-processing are improved, switching to our modified
PatchMatch or to the proposed post-processing based on dense linear fitting,
respectively, and then the proposed technique including both improvements.
Results are reported in Fig.2.12 and Tab.2.4. All versions provide a similar
accuracy performance in the presence of noise, compression and resizing, ex-
cept for a small but consistent improvement observed when the DLF-based
post-processing is used. In the presence of rotation, instead, for angles be-
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Version Feat. Ext. Matching Post-Proc. Total
baseline 2.06 (0.21) 9.00 (0.84) 82.68 (59.61) 93.74 (59.51)
+modPM 2.36 (0.48) 11.96 (1.68) 91.77 (57.23) 106.09 (56.95)
+DLF 2.06 (0.21) 9.00 (0.84) 2.01 ( 0.27) 13.07 ( 0.99)
proposed 2.36 (0.48) 11.96 (1.68) 2.10 ( 0.25) 16.42 ( 2.00)
Table 2.4: CPU-time performance (seconds/image) vs version; in paren-
theses the standard deviations.
yond 15 degrees the performance drops sharply for the versions using basic
PatchMatch, while it remains almost constant for those using modified Patch-
Match. As for computational efficiency, the basic and modified versions of
PatchMatch are almost equivalent, while SATS is much slower than DLF, and
responsible for most of the overall running time, when used. SATS complexity
descends from its iterative nature [28]: given a few reliable close points, it es-
timates an affine transform explaining their offsets, and gradually enriches the
set including only points obeying the same transform. Therefore, outliers are
automatically rejected, improving robustness at the cost of higher CPU time.
With PatchMatch, however, the offset field is already quite regular, allowing
for the use of the much faster DLF without harm.
Technique F-image F-pixel CPU
Christlein2012 93.20 93.52 4377.60
Bravo2011 96.97 90.52 2149.91
Amerini2013 74.07 50.11 156.88
Cozzolino2014 94.85 89.77 2366.57
PM-ZM-cart 93.07 93.11 287.50
PM-ZM-polar 94.95 93.72 244.67
PM-PCT-cart 94.00 93.17 281.37
PM-PCT-polar 95.92 93.62 293.84
PM-FMT 92.00 89.46 424.26
Table 2.5: Image-level and pixel-level F-measure and total CPU-time for
rigid copy-moves on the FAU database.
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2.3.2 Comparison with the state of the art
To position the proposed approach w.r.t. the current state of the art, results
are compared with those of several promising techniques recently proposed in
the literature, most of them designed to deal also with rotation and rescaling.
In particular we consider Bravo2011 [16], Christlein2012 [29]6, Amerini2013
[6], Ryu2013 [91], and Cozzolino2014 [35], the latter being a previous version
of the technique proposed here, with Zernike-cartesian feature, SATS postpro-
cessing, and other minor differences. A comparison with the other techniques
reviewed in [29] can be established using (with caution) the transitive property.
Unfortunately, Ryu2013 turned out to be exceedingly slow on smooth images
(about 15 hours on the 768×1024 image on the top of Fig.2.9), so it does not
appear in the following results, and we will design a separate experiment to
compare with it. For the proposed PatchMatch-based technique (shortnamed
PM from now on) we set Nit = 8 once and for all, but test all proposed fea-
tures.
In Tab.2.5 and Tab.2.6 we report, for the FAU and the GRIP databases,
respectively, the image-level and pixel-level F-measure, together with the to-
tal CPU time, observed for rigid translation. In the top part of the tables we
group reference techniques, and in the bottom part the various versions of the
proposed one. Taking into account the obvious differences, results are very
well aligned on the two databases. In particular, the proposed technique per-
forms best with polar features, both Zernike and PCT, being competitive with
the other dense-field techniques at image level, and generally better than them
at pixel level. As expected, the only keypoint-based technique, Amerini2013,
provides a much worse detection performance, but also the smallest processing
time. Among dense-field techniques, PM is by far the most efficient, with all
features. With Zernike-polar features, in particular, it is at least 3 times faster
than the dense-field references on the GRIP database, and at least 9 times faster
than them on the FAU database. The different speeding-up factors suggest that,
while the complexity of the PatchMatch-based technique scales almost linearly
with the image size, this might not hold for the other dense-field techniques.
We now test robustness against noise addition, compression, rotation
and resizing, showing the image-level and pixel-level F-measure curves in
Figg.2.13 and 2.14, respectively. For the sake of clarity, only the Zernike-
polar feature is considered for the proposed technique. At image level, as
already reported in the tables, the dense-field Bravo2011 and Christlein2012
6We refer to the technique with Zernike features, kd-tree matching, and SATS post-
processing.
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Figure 2.12: Pixel-level F-measure curves for the proposed technique,
the baseline reference, and intermediate versions.
exhibit the best performance in the ideal case, a performance which degrades
rapidly, however, with increasing levels of noise and JPEG compression. At
pixel-level, instead, the proposed PatchMatch-based detector outperforms con-
sistently all the references, with a performance gain that becomes very signifi-
cant in the presence of intense noise and large compression factors, as well as
for moderate scale changes and critical rotation angles around 45o and 135o.
The SIFT-based Amerini2013 deserves a separate discussion. In fact,
thanks to the use of keypoints, it provides the most stable performance across
all conditions, including large-scale resizing, where all considered dense-field
techniques fail. Unfortunately, its overall performance is doomed by the in-
ability to discover copy-moves in smooth areas, lacking the keypoints, and
localization seems to be quite imprecise. Given these complementary proper-
ties, a suitable fusion of keypoint and dense-field approaches may be expected
to provide good results.
Let us now describe the results of an ad hoc experiment designed to in-
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Technique F-image F-pixel CPU
Christlein2012 98.16 87.44 53.91
Bravo2011 95.81 84.44 102.78
Amerini2013 67.72 44.41 3.71
Cozzolino2014 94.67 88.67 54.74
PM-ZM-cart 92.94 92.66 16.63
PM-ZM-polar 94.05 94.06 16.42
PM-PCT-cart 94.61 92.55 14.86
PM-PCT-polar 94.05 93.51 14.69
PM-FMT 91.33 90.56 26.86
Table 2.6: Image-level and pixel-level F-measure and total CPU-time for
rigid copy-moves on the GRIP database.
clude the promising Ryu2013 technique, based on LSH and RANSAC, in the
comparative analysis. To this end, we built a database comprising 40 tex-
tured images, a case in which Ryu2013 presents an acceptable CPU-time, with
size 512×512-pixel, and random square forgeries. Fig.2.15 shows the image-
level F-measure curves. On this set of images, the proposed technique and
Christlein2012 provide almost perfect detection in all cases, except for large
rescaling and intense noise. Also the performance of Ryu2013 is quite sta-
ble, but starting from a worse result on rigid copy-moves. This is due to the
large number of false alarms observed in genuine images. In fact, at pixel
level, when only forged images are considered, Ryu2013 performs as well as
the proposed technique as clear from Fig.2.16. However, it spends on aver-
age 159.05 seconds to process these images, much more than the 21.27 and
4.70 seconds necessary, respectively, for Christlein2012 and for the proposed
technique.
We conclude this Section by showing some examples of challenging
copy-moves from the GRIP database together with the color-coded detec-
tion mask output by Christlein2012 and by the PatchMatch-based detector.
Christlein2012 detects all forgeries, but the masks are rather inaccurate. More-
over, in the second image there are a few false alarms due to a flat background.
On the contrary, the proposed technique detects all forgeries with remarkably
accurate masks and without false alarms.
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2.4 Conclusions
Copy-move forgeries are extremely common, and can be carried out easily
and accurately. Detecting them, on the contrary, can be quite challenging, es-
pecially if they are of the occlusive type, with pieces of background copied
elsewhere to hide some subjects of interest. In these cases, keypoint-based
techniques are mostly ineffective, as they totally neglect low-entropy back-
ground areas. Dense-field techniques, on the other hand, tend to be very slow
because of the feature matching phase, a problem which becomes worse and
worse as the average image size increases.
The technique proposed here is a first step towards fast and accurate copy-
move detection. We use the PatchMatch algorithm to compute efficiently a
high-quality approximate nearest neighbor field for the whole image. Given
this major achievement, we then reduce the overall complexity by implement-
ing also a fast post-processing procedure based on dense linear fitting. More-
over, by resorting to state-of-the-art invariant features, and a suitably modified
version of PatchMatch, we achieve also a good robustness to various type of
geometrical distortions.
Experimental results are quite satisfactory, as they show the proposed tech-
nique to provide state-of-the-art detection performance, with significant im-
provements in terms of localization accuracy and speed. Nonetheless, there is
much room for further improvements. PatchMatch is certainly effective, but
new fast matching algorithms are proposed by the day, and further progresses
can be easily foreseen. Likewise, our post-processing, though effective, can
be certainly further refined. Even so, with much larger images, which will
probably become customary in the near future, all these tools may soon be-
come ineffective, and multiresolution analysis is probably a more solid path
for future research.
Turning to accuracy, a major goal is to achieve higher robustness to resiz-
ing, and include also other forms of geometric distortion. Under this point of
view, the discrete-domain FMT features fail to guarantee the invariance prop-
erties promised by their continuous-domain counterparts. Better implementa-
tions of FMT, or completely new and more robust features, can be probably
proposed. Moreover an extinction of the technique to analyse forged video
would be interesting.
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Chapter 3
Feature-based approach for
forgery localization
I
n this chapter a new camera-based technique based on a dense local de-
scriptor is proposed for tampering localization [99]. Local image descrip-
tors have by now reached a prominent status in image processing. They have
been used with success for such diverse and challenging tasks as image min-
ing and retrieval [113], texture classification [85, 98], face recognition [4, 18],
fingerprint liveness detection [52, 51], steganalysis [44], image quality assess-
ment [81]. In the proposed method, a local descriptor is extracted for each
block of the image under analysis and compared with a model estimated in
advance. Based on the fitting with the model, a score is computed and ag-
gregated over neighboring blocks, to obtain a map highligting likely forged
regions. Model estimation is a crucial step, which requires the availability of
the camera or of a sufficient number of pristine images taken by it.
3.1 Introduction
In forgery detection [56], the key idea is that suitable features can capture the
deviations from the normal behavior induced by typical image forgeries, such
as splicings. It is worth underlining that these deviations are often not per-
ceivable by a human being, since modern image editing tools, if used with
proper skill, allow one to manipulate images leaving little or no obvious arti-
facts, smoothing the boundary between host image and forgery to avoid abrupt
transitions. Major efforts have been devoted to find good statistical models for
natural images in order to select the features that guarantee the highest discrim-
53
54 3. Feature-based approach for forgery localization
inative power. Often, in order to capture more meaningful statistics, transform-
domain features have been used, as in [94] where the image undergoes block-
wise discrete cosine transform (DCT) with various block sizes and first-order
(histogram based) and higher-order (transition probabilities) features are col-
lected and merged.
Recently, following an approach used in steganalysis [44], we proposed
[31] a powerful descriptor-based forgery detection technique. A high-pass fil-
tering is first carried out to compute a residual image where the useless high-
level information is removed and anomalies can be better detected. Then, syn-
thetic features are computed by means of a histogram of occurrence. Given the
good results obtained in detection, we designed also a sliding-window version
of the same algorithm [32] devoted to forgery localization. Specifically, this
latter algorithm was designed to detect traces left by splicings at the boundary
with the host image. However, by deeper investigation, we realized that the
proposed descriptor was discovering much more than the anomalies related to
unnatural boundaries. In fact, it was revealing more general deviations from
the typical appearance of a natural image.
We considered then the following non-exclusive hypotheses:
1. the algorithm was detecting the different camera (device, model, or
brand) that generated the splicing;
2. the algorithm was detecting some forms of image processing.
Indeed, it is well-known [17] that various types of artifacts exist, specific of a
manufacturer or a model or even an individual camera which, in suitable hy-
pothesis, enable one to identify the source of a given image. Likewise, when
an image is tampered with, the different processing history of its regions can
be traced back. Much of the current literature based on features aims to ex-
plore some specific types of processing the forgery could have been subject
to. In [107], following [64], a feature-based procedure is outlined in order to
tell apart regions subject to median filtering from region treated by other forms
of processing. An analogous approach is used in [111], where a noncausal
Markov model is considered in order to capture the underlying statistical char-
acteristics of the signal. Feature-based classification and localization is also
performed in [22], where blurring is detected by using features already con-
sidered for the evaluation of natural image statistics in the context of image
quality assessment [81]. The key idea is that these statistics change when blur-
ring takes place.
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In all these techniques a two-class (pristine/forged) training procedure is
necessary and each method focuses on a particular type of manipulation. The
method proposed in this chapter is itself feature-based, but is not tailored to
a specific type of tampering and requires training only on pristine images. In
particular, the proposed method requires the availability of the source camera
or else of a good number of pristine images taken by it, which are the typical
hypotheses of camera-based methods, like those based on sensor noise [20].
Once local statistics are learnt from the training images, the test image is ana-
lyzed in sliding-window modality to discover deviations from the model, and
local distance measures are aggregated to build a decision map. Unlike tech-
niques based on sensor noise, the proposed algorithm is not influenced by the
scene content, and is computationally efficient.
In next Section the proposed algorithm is described. Sections III and IV
are devoted to the experimental validation, conducted first in more controlled
conditions, to establish some basic properties of the approach, and then for
realistic forgery localization tasks. Finally, the last section draws conclusions.
3.2 Proposed method
In the following we describe how features are extracted, and how they are used
for detection and localization.
3.2.1 Feature extraction
We follow the three-step model already used in [44, 31] comprising
1. computation of residuals through high-pass filtering;
2. quantization of the residuals;
3. computation of a histogram of co-occurrences.
The final histogram is the feature vector associated with the whole image,
which can be used for classification. To compute the residual image we use a
linear high-pass filter of the third order, which assured us a good performance
in the context of forgery detection [31], defined as
rij = xi,j−1 − 3xi,j + 3xi,j+1 − xi,j+2
where x and r are origin and residual images, and i, j indicate spatial coordi-
nates.
56 3. Feature-based approach for forgery localization
More then in the residual themselves, we are interested in their co-
occurrences, which provide information on higher-order phenomena and are
based on larger support areas. Of course, residuals must be first quantized and,
in order to obtain a manageable number of bins in the histogram, a very small
number of quantization values must be considered. As suggested in [44] we
perform quantization and truncation as:
r̂ij = truncT (round(rij/q))
with q the quantization step and T the truncation value. To limit the matrix
size we use T = 2 and q = 1. At this point we compute co-occurrence on four
pixels in a row, that is
C(k0, k1, k2, k3) =∑
i,j
I(qi,j = k0, qi+1,j = k1, qi+2,j = k2, qi+3,j = k3)
The homologous column-wise co-occurrences are pooled with the above based
on symmetry considerations, obtaining eventually a 625-bin histogram, which
is reduced to little more than 300 by further symmetry arguments.
As a final step, to reduce the weight of outliers in the subsequent training
and classification phases, we pass the resulting features through a square-root
non-linearity. Starting from normalized histograms (unitary sum) the final fea-
tures happen to have unitary L2 norm.
3.2.2 Detection/identification
We consider first the simpler detection problem, which requires to classify a
whole image or image region as genuine (hypothesis H0) or tampered (hypoth-
esis H1). We assume to know the camera which took the photos and have a
large enough collection of images taken with the same camera or even the free-
dom to take new ones. On the contrary, we know nothing on the camera used
to produce the possible forgery. Rather than training a two-class classifier us-
ing blocks drawn from the most heterogeneous sources for hypothesis H1, we
consider a model-based approach. Following the methodology used in [82],
we fit the available H0 samples through a multidimensional gaussian and carry
out a threshold test. To this end, we estimate the mean vector and covariance
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Figure 3.1: Graphic scheme of aggreation procedure.
matrix of the features hn
µ =
1
N
N∑
n=1
hn
Σ =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(hn − µ)(hn − µ)T
Then for each new feature under test, say h′ we compute the log-likelihood
w.r.t. the Gaussian model (neglecting constants)
L(h′) = (h′ − µ)TΣ−1(h′ − µ)
and compare it with a threshold. Setting the threshold might be a challenging
problem, but we do not analyze it here, and will compute performance as a
function of this parameter.
3.2.3 Localization
In localization we assume to know already that a region of the image has been
tampered with and want to delineate as accurately as possible its position and
shape. A simple solution based on the detection procedure described above
consists in using it in a sliding-window modality, with the window sizeW×W
trading off reliability for resolution. We consider partially overlapping blocks,
taken with step 1 ≤ S < W , and aggregate all decisions a map, summing -1 or
+1 in the map for all pixels of the block depending on the decision, pristine or
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Figure 3.2: Camera-based (left) and processing-based (right) detection
performance using a Canon EOS 450D as target camera.
tampered, respectively. To improve the performance, rather than just the sign,
we associate a real-valued strength to the block under test, depending on the
reliability of the decision, so as to give more importance to clear-cut situations.
By aggregating these strengths, a real valued map is generated, based on which
all decisions are eventually made. Fig.3.1 describes pictorially the aggregation
procedure. In our case, it is straightforward to associate the strength with the
log-likelihood itself. A threshold is eventually needed to single out the suspect
tampered region but, again, we do not address this problem here, resorting to
ROC curves to analyze performance.
3.3 Preliminary tests on tampering detection
Although our main focus is on tampering localization, we carry out some pre-
liminary tests for the more controlled detection case. These tests, in particular,
will shed some light on the validity of the two conjectures sketched in the
Introduction. We analyze them in turn.
3.3.1 Camera-based detection
For our experiments we have 6 cameras available, of 6 different models, pro-
duced by four manufacturers: Canon EOS 450D, Canon IXUS 95IS, Nikon
D200, Nikon Coolpix S5100, Digimax 301, Sony DSC S780. For each camera
we have a relatively large number of images, always more than 100, which are
cropped to size 768×1024, for simplicity, aligned with the JPEG grid.
As first experiment we consider one target camera for hypothesis H0, and
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several more for hypothesis H1. From each available test image, not included
in the training set, we extract 140 blocks of size 128×128 pixels, drawn with
step 64 pixels on rows/columns. Each block is then independently classified
as pristine or tampered. In Fig.3.2(left) we show the receiver operating curves
(ROC) obtained for the Canon EOS 450D by varying the decision threshold.
Results are always very good, and almost perfect in several cases. Although
good results can be obtained with other approaches as well, it is worth under-
lining that our method is very general, does not depend on specific attributes
of digital photos (e.g., CFA, quantization tables, etc.) nor is tailored to specific
brands or models.
This experiment makes clear that the descriptor is indeed capturing some
subtle camera-related feature and hints (a field proof is given in next section)
that a splicing coming from a different camera can be very likely detected
and localized. Let us therefore turn to the second conjecture: can we detect
tampering based on processing history?
3.3.2 Processing-based detection
To test the second conjecture, we now consider the same camera for both host
images and forgeries, but assume that the forgery has been subject to some type
of processing before splicing, such as JPEG compression, resizing, etc., which
is typically the case, both for the different history of the images and because
the inserted material is often manipulated to have a natural appearance in the
new context. In this case, quite a large number of combinations could be con-
sidered, but we focus only on JPEG compression, postponing to next Section
a more detailed analysis. Results shown in Fig.3.2(right) are also in this case
very good. When the test blocks are compressed with QF 85 or even 90, the
ROC is almost perfect, characterized by an area under curve (AUC), shown in
parentheses in the legend, exceeding 0.99. Performance becomes appreciably
worse for QF 95, but remains still good (with AUC=0.93), considering also
that, for the camera under test, blocks that are nominally uncompressed are
actually compressed with quality factor 98.
This second experiment fully confirms also our second conjecture, so we
can conclude that the proposed approach is able to accurately identify devia-
tions from the model, even subtle deviations, due both to the different source
camera and to the different processing history of the forgery.
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Figure 3.3: Camera-based localization performance (Canon EOS 450D
on the left and Nikon D200 on the right).
3.4 Tampering localization experiments
Let us now consider some more realistic experiments with forged images, fol-
lowing the same path of the preceding Section. In each host image, of size
768×1024 pixel, we insert a random square forgery of size 192 × 192 in ran-
dom positions in the image.
3.4.1 Camera-based localization
In a first experiment, the host image is taken by the target camera while the
forgery comes from another unknown camera. Blocks of size 128×128 are
drawn from the image with step 16 pixels on rows/columns. for each one
we compute the log-likelihood of its feature w.r.t. the gaussian model fitted
to the target camera. These quantities are then reprojected on the image and
aggregated. The final map is eventually thresholded, and ROCs are computed
as the threshold value λ varies. Fig.3.3 shows the ROCs obtained for two
different host cameras (a Canon EOS 450D and a Nikon D200), again quite
satisfactory. Note that all performance indicators are computed pixel-wise,
therefore the curves depart from the ideal behavior not because forgeries are
not localized, which never happens in these experiments, but because of the
obvious inaccuracy in detecting the exact shape of the forgery. Some examples
are shown in Fig.3.6, last column: the forgeries are correctly localized, but
their shape is recovered only approximately. Better decision strategies, as in
[23], can certainly improve upon this basic procedure.
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3.4.2 Processing-based localization
We now repeat the above experiment, but the forgery is generated by the same
camera that took the host image. However, before insertion, the forgery under-
goes some kind of processing which changes its statistics. In Fig.3.5 we report
some results for two host cameras and four common processing tasks, that
is blurring, compression, resizing, rotation. For each case, we show several
ROCs obtained by changing the main parameter of interest, e.g., the quality
factor in JPEG compression. Results are again very good in all cases. To
observe a significant drop in performance we must consider very challenging
situations, such as rotation with a very small angle, or JPEG compression with
quality factor 95, and even in these cases the AUC remains near or beyond
0.80. It is worth underlining that a human being would hardly detect such
high-quality forgeries by visual inspection. Some interesting phenomena, yet
to investigate, concern resizing, less detectable for scales below 1 than above
it, and rotation, where performance depends more strongly than expected on
the angle.
3.4.3 Performance comparison
We conclude this analysis carrying out an experimental comparison with other
two well-known camera-based techniques, which exploit the photo response
non-uniformity (PRNU) noise, and the color filter array (CFA), respectively.
In particular, for PRNU-based localization we use the algorithm recently pro-
posed in [27], using a Bayesian framework and modern optimization tech-
niques, while the CFA-based technique has been proposed in [40]. We built
a quite varied training set, using three cameras (Canon IXUS-95IS, Nikon
Coolpix-S5100, Digimax-301), and considering all combination of forgeries
with and without JPEG compression, resizing, rotation, and blurring. Results
are reported in Fig.3.4. The proposed method performs slightly better than
the PRNU-based technique, and significantly better than the CFA-based one.
Moreover, while the proposed method has negligible complexity, the PRNU-
based technique, based on MRF modeling and optimization, has a significant
run time.
Finally, we show some examples of realistic forgeries to enable a compar-
ison of the proposed and PRNU-based techniques by visual inspection. Note
that the threshold for the proposed method has been set to a fixed value equal
to 1.75, while for the PRNU-based technique we considered the setting of the
original paper [27]. The first forgery has not been processed, but come from a
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camera different from the host, the following two come from the host camera,
but have been resized before splicing, the forth and fifth come from a different
camera with resizing, the last one from the host camera after blurring.
The proposed technique has a very good detection performance, with no
false alarms, while the reference PRNU-based method occasionally (rarely)
exhibits some false alarms and misses, as in some of the examples of Figg. 3.6
and 3.7, selected on purpose. For the proposed technique errors concern only
the limited ability to follow the shape of the forgery, affecting the pixel-based
ROCs.
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Figure 3.4: Performance comparison (Canon EOS 450D on the left and
Nikon D200 on the right).
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3.5 Conclusions
We propose a new camera-based technique for forgery localization based on a
simple modeling of natural image statistics. A large number of blocks are ex-
tracted off-line from training images and characterized through features based
on a dense local descriptor. A multidimensional Gaussian model is then fit to
the training features. In the testing phase, the image is analyzed in sliding-
window modality: for each block, the log-likelihood of the associated feature
is computed, reprojected in the image domain, and aggregated, so as to form
a smooth decision map. Despite its simplicity, it provides a very good perfor-
mance in a wide range of experimental conditions. Future research will include
a more thorough investigation of the many design choices of the technique (e.g.
features, model, decision strategy, etc.) and its optimization w.r.t. the main pa-
rameters. This analysis could help in understanding which characteristics of
the camera are effectively captured by this approach. Further experimental
analysis is also necessary to study robustness to subsequent processing and
possible countermeasures.
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Conclusion
D igital image forensics is a relatively new field of research, with a grow-ing number of contributions from researchers of different background,
but also with a large number of issues still open.
In this thesis, we face the problems of image forgery detection and local-
ization through passive techniques. A general solution to these problems does
not exist, and a large number of techniques have been proposed in literature fol-
lowing various approaches. As explained in the introduction, the availability
of different and complementary tools is essential to obtain satisfactory results
in real-world situations, where there is a wide typology of possible manipula-
tions.
Here, we have provided contributions in three different contexts: PRNU-
based approaches, pixel-based copy-move detection, and model-based meth-
ods. In the first case, we have developed a fast strategy that exploits the image
structure, through guided filtering, to improve the localization of small-size
forgeries. Future developments will include a segmentation-based analysis. In
the second context, we have devised a novel dense-field technique for copy-
move forgery detection, based on a fast patch matching tool recently proposed
in the literature. We obtained a significant improvement in terms of localiza-
tion accuracy and speed compared with the state-of-the-art, with good robust-
ness to copy-move rotation and other types of distortion. A future goal is to
improve robustness also with respect scale changes and other geometric trans-
formations. In the third scenery, we adopted a model-based method relying on
a suitable local image descriptor. Despite its low complexity, this technique
provides a very good performance in a wide range of conditions. In future
research we will consider a blind scenery, in which the camera is not known.
All techniques have been carefully validated by experimenting on large
and meaningful datasets, and comparing performance with the state-of-the-
art references. In all cases, besides performance, we paid great attention to
computational complexity. Moreover, we take pride in making our research
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reproducible, by publishing online source or executable code and reference
datasets.
There are several open questions, of a more general nature, for future re-
search. A first one is how to merge the many available tools [30, 42] in order
to obtain reliable results for the widest possible range of attacks. Also, the ex-
tension of these methods to the case of video poses new problems, not only for
the different nature of the data, but also for the largely increased computational
load. Another interesting scenario arises when an expert attacker, aware of the
specific forensic approach, can take countermeasures. Counter-forensics is the
research field that studies forensic techniques to find their weak points [12], of
interest both for the attacker and the defender in a foreseeable arms race. All
such issues are stimulating intense research, making of image forensics one of
the more stimulating and competitive topics in the image processing field.
Appendix A
The First IFS-TC Image
Forensics Challenge
I
n last few years, Digital image forensics is gaining a great deal of atten-
tion in the scientific community. Therefore in 2013 the IEEE Information
Forensics and Security Technical Committee (IFS-TC) launched a detection
and localization forensics challenge, the First Image Forensics Challenge [3].
It had different goals:
• to provide the community with an open data set and protocol for eval-
uation of the latest forensics techniques to identify forgeries in digital
images;
• to evaluate the current state-of-the-art techniques with respect to their
ability to detect and localize forgeries;
• to set forth a standardization protocol as a common comparison ground
truth for new techniques.
The challenge comprised several original images captured from different
digital cameras with various scenes either indoor or outdoor. No informa-
tion was provided on the number and types of cameras. The forged images
comprised a set of different manipulation techniques such as copy-move and
splicing with different degrees of photorealism.
Moreover the challenge included two sections, the phase 1 for image forgery
detection and the phase 2 devoted to image forgery localization. For the phase
1, each participating team had to detect the forged images from a test set of
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5713 images. The score was defined as
S =
Pr(F̂ |F ) + Pr(P̂ |P )
2
(A.1)
with P [F ] indicating the event “image pristine[fake]” and P̂ [F̂ ] the event “de-
cision pristine[fake]”, respectively. For the phase 2, the teams were required to
provide a mask corresponding to the areas declared forged for each image of
a test set of 700 forged images. A score was then computed as the average F-
measure over all test images. Note that F-measure of a single image is defined
as
FM =
2 TP
2 TP + FN + FP
(A.2)
where TP (true positive), FN (false negative), and FP (false positive) count, re-
spectively, the number of detected forged pixels, undetected forged pixels, and
wrongly detected genuine pixels. A training set was also available, comprising
about 1500 images (450 fake and 1050 pristine). The groups participating in
the Challenge had the opportunity to receive a limited feedback by submitting
their results once a day. Scores were then computed on a randomized subset
of the test set to avoid disclosing valuable information through the system.
he GRIP research group of the University Federico II participated in both
phases of the Challenge. In this Appendix we describe the adopted strategy
[31, 32]. Given the nature of the dataset, we realized very soon that a fusion of
different tools was necessary. Indeed, real-world image forgery detection and
localization can be extremely challenging because of the wide availability of
powerful photo-editing tools which allow for different types of manipulations,
and considering the large variety of operative conditions encountered in prac-
tice, including compression, blurring, distortions, etc. No single method can
be expected to work satisfactorily in all these cases, and in fact the literature
confirms [30, 42] that a suitable fusion of tools can largely improve detec-
tion performance over single methods, especially in adverse and unpredictable
conditions. Therefore, we developed three complementary tools based, re-
spectively, on machine-learning, block matching and camera sensor noise and
carried out eventually a suitable fusion of decisions.
In the next three subsections we describe the three proposed tools. Then
we describe the decision fusion strategy and provide some numerical results.
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A.1 Tool based on machine-learning
Several feature-based techniques have been proposed in the last decade for
splicing detection. Major efforts have been devoted to find good statistical
models for natural images in order to select the features that guarantee the
highest discriminative power. Interestingly, the method proposed in [94] was
inspired by prior work carried out in steganalysis which, despite the obvious
differences with respect to the forgery detection field, pursues a very similar
goal, that is, detecting seemingly invisible alterations of the natural charac-
teristics of an image. Good results are obtained with features based on some
co-occurrence matrices computed on the thresholded prediction-error image,
also called residual image. In fact, modeling the residuals rather than the pixel
values is very sensible in these low-level methods (not based on image se-
mantic), since the image content does not help detecting local alterations and
should be suppressed altogether. In the context of forgery detection, in partic-
ular, considering that splicing typically introduces sharp edges, it is reasonable
to characterize statistically some edge image, which can also be the output of
a simple high-pass filter, like a derivative of first order. As a further advan-
tage, the residual image has a much narrower dynamic range than the original
one, allowing for a compact and robust statistical description by means of co-
occurrences.
The processing path outlined above, already proposed in [114], can be
therefore summarized in the following steps
1. computation of the high-pass residuals;
2. truncation and quantization;
3. feature extraction based on co-occurrence matrices of selected neigh-
bors;
4. design of a suitable classifier on the training set.
Given its compelling rationale, and the promising results obtained in the lit-
erature, we chose to adhere strictly to this path. Even so, a large number of
design choices had to be made, beginning from the high-pass filter, to end with
the classifier, which impact heavily on the performance and require a lengthy
development and testing phase. Fortunately, we could rely on the precious re-
sults described in a recent work on steganalysis [44], where a large number of
models have been considered, analyzed, and made available online to the re-
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Figure A.1: A training image with its ground truth and an example resid-
ual image.
search community 1. In [44] 39 different high-pass filters are proposed, which
work on the grayscale version of the original image obtained by standard con-
version. All such filters are quite simple, since their goal is to highlight minor
variations w.r.t. typical behaviors. Two examples among the simplest are the
first order horizontal linear filter
ri,j = xi,j+1 − xi,j
and the first order symmetric nonlinear filter
ri,j = min[(xi,j+1 − xi,j), (xi+1,j − xi,j)]
Fig.A.1 shows the effect of applying one of such filters to a training image of
the challenge.
Residuals are in general real-valued and, although typically small, are de-
fined on a wide range. To enable their meaningful characterization in terms of
co-occurrence they must be quantized and truncated. Following [44] we used
r̂ij = truncT (round(rij/q))
with q the quantization step and T the truncation value. We used T = 2 to
limit the matrix size and considered exclusively q = 1, both to reduce com-
plexity, and to limit the risk of overfitting to our training set. Each quantized
residual can eventually take on 5 values, from -2 to +2. We then computed
co-occurrences on four consecutive pixels along the same row or column, ob-
taining 625 entries, which can be highly reduced thanks to symmetries.
1http://dde.binghamton.edu/download/feature extractors/
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A.1.1 Detection based on machine-learning
In the classification phase we departed significantly from the reference tech-
nique, due to the overfitting problem. In fact, each individual model comprises
169 features for linear filters and 325 for non linear ones, a number large but
still manageable with the training set available in the challenge. Merging all
models, however, would lead to a much larger number of features, too large to
carry out a meaningful training. In [44] this problem was dealt with by means
of an ensemble classifier, but the training set was about ten times larger.
For the phase 1 of the challenge, we decided therefore to test each model
individually, relying heavily on cross validation to gain a reasonable insight
into their actual performance. In each experiment, we selected at random 5/6
of the pristine images and 5/6 of the fake ones to train a SVM classifier. The re-
maining images of each class were then used to test the trained classifier. To re-
duce randomness, each experiment was repeated 18 times, selecting the train-
ing and test set at random, and results were eventually averaged. Fig.A.2(top)
shows the results for the 39 models considered, in terms of expected score of
the challenge. For several models the predicted score was in the order of 94%,
hence very promising. To further improve results, we tried to merge the fea-
tures of a limited number of models, up to four, not to exceed the number of
training images. Results are reported in Tab.A.1 in terms of score obtained
before and after merging. The merging did not seem to guarantee any im-
provement over the best single-model classifier, moreover, the score exhibited
a non-monotonic behavior as more models were merged, ringing an alarm bell
on stability.
To improve robustness, we considered a different measure of performance.
For each SVM classifier, we displaced the separating hyperplane along the
orthogonal direction, and built the corresponding ROC. Then we computed,
for each model, the Area Under the receiver operating Curve (AUC), because
a large AUC implies not only a good performance in the best operating point,
but also robustness w.r.t. changing conditions. Fig.A.2(bottom) shows results.
Although there is a clear correlation, the top-score models do not coincide
with the top-AUC models. We then tried merging the best models selected
with this latter criterion, obtaining the results reported in Tab.A.2. This time,
performance improved monotonically with merging, providing a gain of about
1% over the best individual model,
Eventually, our SVM classifier used the merging of all the features of mod-
els 17, 31, 34 and 36, and was trained over the whole training set.
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Figure A.2: Scores (top) and AUC (bottom) for all models.
Model Type Score AUC Score/merg.
3 NL, 1st order 0.9429 0.9724 0.9429
4 NL, 1st order 0.9403 0.9693 0.9154
12 NL, 2nd order 0.9389 0.9685 0.9415
11 NL, 2nd order 0.9371 0.9595 0.9163
Table A.1: Score obtained by the top-score individual models, and by
their merging.
A.1.2 Localization based on machine-learning
Given the good performance obtained in the phase 1 of the Challenge we im-
plemented the same procedure in the phase 2 but on a sliding-window basis.
Hence, for each image block, the algorithm performed a classification step,
collecting not only the sign of the decision, but also its real-valued strength,
which measures reliability. Then all strengths were aggregated with their sign
to make the final decision.
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Model Type Score AUC Score/merg.
36 linear, 3rd order 0.9289 0.9765 0.9289
34 linear, 1st order 0.9316 0.9751 0.9462
17 NL, 3rd order 0.9369 0.9736 0.9481
31 NL, square 5× 5 0.9371 0.9727 0.9531
Table A.2: Score obtained by the top-AUC individual models, and by
their merging.
Figure A.3: Two training fake images, their SDH map and the color
coded detection mask. Green indicates correct detection, false alarms are
in red.
In order to perform classification a preliminary feature extraction process
was required, followed by the training of a SVM classifier with linear kernel.
Features were computed on 10000 128 × 128-pixel blocks, 5000 pristine and
5000 fake, extracted by the training images. Note that, in this context, a fake
block is not a block drawn entirely from a tampered region, but rather a bound-
ary block, since the most relevant information to discover a forgery is hidden in
the transition areas. More precisely, we labeled as fake only the blocks which,
according to the ground truth, comprise from 20% to 80% forged pixels. Fea-
tures were then derived based on the co-occurrence matrices computed on the
thresholded prediction-error image using only the best model found in phase
1, a 3rd order linear filter [44].
The image under test was analyzed in sliding-window modality, with par-
tially overlapping 128× 128-pixels blocks and a 16-pixel step. For each block
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we computed the distance of the corresponding feature vector from the SVM
hyperplane, since the larger the distance, the more reliable the result. By ag-
gregating all these values for each pixel we obtained an index, named SDH
(Sum of Distances from the Hyperplane), which is roughly related to the prob-
ability that the pixel has been tampered. The final binary map was obtained
by thresholding this index. Given the peak value of the SDH over the whole
image, called PSDH, an empirical analysis on the training set suggested to use
a threshold equal to 0.25*PSDH. Fig.A.3 shows some sample results. Note
that the PSDH index computed for the this technique represents a measure of
detection reliability, useful to guide the final decision fusion. Small values of
PSDH can be attributed to random fluctuations, and the corresponding local-
ization map is scarcely reliable.
A.2 Tool based on block-matching
As explained in the Chapter 2, many algorithms for copy-move forgery detec-
tion and localization have been proposed in the literature [29]. These tech-
niques aim to discover identical or very similar regions of the image which are
likely the effect of some image tampering.
In the Forensics Challenge we used an embryonal version of the dense
technique described in Chapter 2. The dense methods compute a nearest neigh-
bor field (NNF) over all blocks of the image. After this, the areas with ho-
mogeneous displacement are selected as candidate forged regions and some
candidates are eliminated to reduce false alarms.
We followed a similar line of work, resorting to PatchMatch [9], an iter-
ative algorithm recently proposed for image editing applications. Patchmatch
provides a very accurate and regular NNF, but we chose it primarily for its
rapid convergence, which makes it about 100 times faster than exact methods,
allowing us to process in reasonable time a large database of images. We used
7×7 pixel patches, a size that guarantees a good compromise among accuracy,
resolution and speed. All image pixels were preliminarily adjusted to unitary
norm, in order to single out copy-moves also in the presence of some inten-
sity adjustments. After computing the NNF, we carried out a filtering on both
horizontal and vertical components of the NNF to identify regions with ho-
mogeneous displacement. Choosing an appropriate prediction filter, we could
also identify regions where displacement vectors slowly increase or decrease
linearly, thus identifying also copy-moves with moderate resizing.
All matches obtained in perfectly flat areas, as in presence of saturation,
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Figure A.4: Four training images with copy-move forgeries, their ground
truth, and detection maps output by our method.
were removed to reduce false alarms; likewise, very small regions were also
deleted automatically through morphological filtering. For the phase 1, the im-
age was classified as fake if at least one duplicated region was detected. Instead
for the phase 2, for each motion vector we compared the image with its shifted
version and computed a dense correlation map which, after thresholding and
morphological operations, provided the binary map relative to a single copied
object. To find also rotated or resized copy-moves, we simply repeated the pro-
cedure for a number of rotations and resizing of the image, taking advantage
of PatchMatch speed.
Fig.A.4 shows four images with copy-move forgeries, the corresponding
ground truth, and the detection map output by our method. Note that the
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Figure A.5: Steps adopted in PRNU-based tool.
forgery is easily detected, and the map is quite accurate, even when original
and copied regions are partially overlapping.
A.3 Tool based on camera sensor noise
The Photo Response Non Uniformity (PRNU) noise represents sort of a cam-
era fingerprint, which is present in all pristine images produced by the camera
but absent in tampered areas. By detecting the presence/absence of the cam-
era PRNU in the image under test, one is able to make reliable decisions on
the presence of forgeries [77, 27]. A more detailed description of the PRNU-
based approach is given in Chapter 1. In general, the camera PRNU pattern is
assumed to be already available, but this is only true if we have a collection
of images taken by the camera large enough to carry out a reliable estimate.
However, this is not always the case, and certainly not the case of the Chal-
lenge, since no information was available on the origin of either the training or
the test images. Indeed, a large number of images were available, but no infor-
mation was disclosed about the cameras used to take them. In principle, each
of these images could have been taken by a different camera, frustrating any
attempt to use a PRNU-based strategy. However, we relied on the reasonable
conjecture that the unknown number of cameras M used to build the database
was much smaller than N .
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Our algorithm comprises therefore the following steps:
1. group the training images in C + 1 clusters (one for left-overs);
2. estimate the PRNU for the C valid clusters;
3. associate each test image with one of the clusters;
4. localize forgeries.
For the clustering, we relied on the fact that two images, taken by the same
camera, have the same PRNU pattern. At the end of the first step, clusters
formed by a sufficient number of images would allow us to estimate the cor-
responding camera PRNU and perform forgery detection. To carry out the
clustering we used the algorithm proposed in [15] which is a simplified ver-
sion of the well-known pairwise nearest neighbor (PNN) algorithm. In PNN,
at the beginning each data vector vj is the center of a cluster with just one
element and weight wj = 1. Then, the two closest centers, say v′ and v′′ are
merged together, provided they are closer than a given threshold, generating by
weighted averaging a new center that replaces the existing ones, in formulas
vnew = (w
′v′ + w′′v′′)/(w′ + w′′) (A.3)
wnew = w
′ + w′′
By so doing, the number of centers decreases by one at a time, and the process
continues until all centers are farther apart than the threshold, providing the
desired clustering. Even fast versions of PNN, however, are computationally
demanding, as distances among all couples of data vectors must be computed.
The algorithm proposed in [15] introduces some modifications to reduce com-
putation time, like picking at random couples to be compared with the thresh-
old, or looking for all points of a cluster before proceeding with another one.
In our case, the data vectors represent basic estimates of the camera PRNU
that are gradually improved through merging. As distance measure we used
the Peak to Correlation Energy ratio (PCE) [49], more robust than the correla-
tion index. Since the images used in the challenge might have been cropped at
random from larger images produced by the cameras (image dimensions vary
from 480×640 to 3240×4320), we had to consider the correlation of an image
w.r.t. all shifted versions of another one, and pick the maximum. This was
accomplished, as in [50], by first zero-padding images to the same size and
then working in the transform domain, obtaining at once the distances corre-
sponding to all circularly shifted versions. We carried out the clustering on the
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Figure A.6: Number of images belonging to the clustered sets.
training set using a threshold equal to 50, and identified 44 different clusters,
for a total of 746 pristine images out of the 1050 available and 315 fakes out
of 450 (see Fig.A.6).
Although in the clustering phase the PRNU was estimated, the final esti-
mate for the cluster C was computed according to the maximum likelihood
rule [77]. At this point we tried to associate the test images with one of the
estimated PRNU’s. Setting a threshold equal to 100 on the PCE, we were able
to classify 431 of the 700 images available, about 60% of the total, as shown
in Fig.A.6.
For all forged images belonging to one of the identified clusters, forgery
detection was carried out as proposed in [20] using the normalized correlation
index to the 129× 129 window Wi centered on the target pixel. With respect
to the original algorithm, there are two main differences. First, to improve the
quality of the noise residuals we resorted to nonlocal denoising, in particular
to BM3D [37]. This choice, as shown in [24, 27], improves the separation
between image content and PRNU, especially in textured areas. In addition,
we used an adaptive decision threshold, which depends on the reliability of
the correlation field, measured by the PCE. In fact, due to the lack of prior
information on the cameras, the correlation fields are not all equally reliable,
depending on the estimation accuracy of the reference PRNU (which depends
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Figure A.7: Two training fake images, correlation maps and color-coded
detection masks. Green indicates correct detection, false alarms are in
red.
in turn on how many images were available in the cluster) and of the noise
residual under test. Therefore, the PCE provides us with a rough measure of
reliability, which will be extremely valuable in the decision fusion phase.
It is worth underlining that the correlation might happen to be very low
when the image is dark, saturated or strongly textured, increasing the false
alarm probability in these areas. In [20] this problem is addresses by means of
a predictor which, based on local images features, such as texture, flatness and
intensity, computes the expected value of the correlation index under the hy-
pothesis that PRNU is present. In the Challenge, we did not use the predictor,
as it proves unreliable when estimated only on a few images. However, we kept
enforcing a control on saturated areas, where the PRNU is totally unreliable.
In Fig.A.7 we show two images of the training set with the corresponding cor-
relation maps (low values correspond to red in this case) and detection masks.
The algorithm for copy-move forgeries is not able to distinguish the orig-
inal object from the copy. However, we can use the information coming from
the PRNU-based approach (when available) to remove this uncertainty as in
the example of Fig.A.8. This technique, however, worked well only when the
tested objects were relatively large and the correlation map was sufficiently
reliable (PCE>150), in all other cases we declared both regions as forged.
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Figure A.8: A training fake image, its correlation map, its PatchMatch-
based map, and the final color-coded mask.
A.4 Decision fusion
We implemented three tools based on quite different approaches, machine-
learning, block matching, and sensor noise. For the forgery detection, the
tool based on machine-learning guaranteed an excellent performance on the
training set, with a missing detection rate of 7.10%, and a false alarm rate of
2.29%. Moreover, the “fake” decision of copy-move detector was very reliable,
it detected the large majority of the copy-move forgeries in the training set with
only 5 false alarms out of 1050 pristine images. Instead, the PRNU-based tool
had poor detection performance.
Given these premises, for the phase 1 we discarded the PRNU-based tool
and our fusion rule consisted in a simple OR among only two tools: an image
was declared fake whenever any of the tools did so, and pristine only if both
tools agreed on that.
For the phase 2, our fusion strategy is described by the flow-chart of
Fig.A.9. A general guideline was to keep into great account all information
about reliability. In particular, since F-measure results computed on the train-
ing set made very clear the superior reliability of the copy-move detector, we
used only its map when available, and integrated it with the PRNU-based map
only when the latter was itself extremely reliable (PCE>1200). Then when
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Figure A.9: Flow chart of the combination strategy.
no copy-move was detected, we trusted, in decreasing order, the PRNU-based
map and the map based on machine-learning.
# Leader Team Score
1 Luisa Verdoliva grip 0.9421
2 Guanshuo Xu havefun 0.9373
3 Xinqi Lin hyrup 0.9346
4 Licong Chen Chen 0.9323
5 Khosro Bahrami Fake Bluster 0.8574
6 Dev Sh ITD 0.8240
Table A.3: Final ranking (first six teams) for phase 1 of the Challenge.
A.5 Results and Conclusions
For phase 1 of the challenge, our final score, computed on the whole test set,
was 0.9421 as opposed to the 0.9738 on the training set. Note that the score ob-
tained by running individually the two approaches is 0.8130 for the copy-move
detection and 0.9150 for the method based on machine-learning. Interestingly,
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# Leader Team FM
1 Luisa Verdoliva grip 0.4072
2 Guanshuo Xu havefun 0.2678
3 Licong Chen Chen 0.1843
4 Xinqi Lin hyrup 0.1643
Table A.4: Final ranking for phase 2 of the Challenge.
Method FM
PRNU 0.1620
LD 0.1115
PM 0.3425
SIFT [6] 0.0528
Zernike [29] 0.1609
JPEG [13] 0.0418
Demosaicking [40] 0.1013
Table A.5: Comparisons of the three approaches described in this work
with some state-of-the-art methods.
the scores of the first four groups, shown in Tab.A.3, were very close to one
another suggesting that a plateau had been probably reached.
For phase 2, on the training set our strategy provided an average F-measure
of 0.4153, and a very similar result was obtained on the test set, 0.4072 (Table
A.4). Four sample results on the test set are shown in Fig.A.10.
In order to have a better insight on the experimental results, we also ran
individually the three methods and compared them with some approaches ap-
peared in the recent literature [6, 29, 13, 40]. As it is possible to observe
from Table A.5 the score obtained by the three tools used in the Challenge are
comparatively good. The described strategies allowed us to rank first in both
phases of the Challenge.
We feel there are quite a few lessons to learn from this experience. Under
a strictly technical point of view, exploring locally the statistical features in the
images is arguably the state-of-the-art approach in forgery detection. Nonethe-
less, the fusion of more tools can further improve performance. In the future
research we will focus especially on the fusion of the available information,
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both at the pixel and image level, by a more effective strategy [30, 42, 41] than
the empirical rules used in this contest. Under a wider point of view, we be-
lieve that the Challenge [3] , with its large corpus of images and well-defined
performance evaluation protocols, represents an important step for the growth
of this field.
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Figure A.10: Four images from the test set and their output masks.
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